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Abstract
The classical, complete-information two-player games assume that the problem data (in particular
the payoff matrix) is known exactly by both players. In a now famous result, Nash has shown that
any such game has an equilibrium in mixed strategies. This result was later extended to a class of
incomplete-information two-player games by Harsanyi, who assumed that the payoff matrix is not
known exactly but rather represents a random variable that is governed by a probability distribution
known to both players.
In 2006, Bertsimas and Aghassi [1] proposed a new class of distribution-free two-player games
where the payoff matrix is only known to belong to a given uncertainty set. This model relaxes
the distributional assumptions of Harsanyi’s Bayesian games, and it gives rise to an alternative
distribution-free equilibrium concept.
In this thesis we present a new model of incomplete information games without private informa-
tion in which the players use a distributionally robust optimization approach to cope with the payoff
uncertainty. With some specific restrictions, we show that our “Distributionally Robust Game”
constitutes a true generalization of the three aforementioned finite games (Nash games, Bayesian
Games and Robust Games). Subsequently, we prove that the set of equilibria of an arbitrary dis-
tributionally robust game with specified ambiguity set can be computed as the component-wise
projection of the solution set of a multi-linear system of equations and inequalities. Finally, we
demonstrate the applicability of our new model of games and highlight its importance.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Game theory could be considered the field of mathematics and economics that has witnessed the
most explosive growth the last century. It is the study of multi-person decision problems, in which
the payoff of each person(player) of the game, depends not only on his chosen strategy but also on
the strategies of the other players.
The reason for this explosive growth, is the number of real life applications that could be
formulated using game theoretical models. For example, in the area of economics and business,
game theory is used for modelling competing behaviours of interacting agents (auctions, bargain-
ing, mergers and acquisitions pricing). Models of game theory could also describe applications in
political science in which the players are voters, special interest groups, and politicians. In biology,
games have been used for better understanding several phenomena like evolution and animal com-
munication. Furthermore, games play an increasingly important role in logic and computer science
(on-line algorithms, algorithmic game theory, algorithmic mechanism design).
The idea of a general theory of games was introduced by John von Neumann and Oskar Mor-
genstern in their famous book Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour (1944,[43]) in which
they presented the first axioms of game theory. Based on this work many type of games have been
proposed in the last decades.
The classical, complete-information finite games assume that the problem data (in particular
the payoff matrix) is known exactly by all players. In a now famous result(1950, [33], [32]), Nash
has shown that any such game has an equilibrium in mixed strategies. More specifically, in his
formulation Nash assumed that all players are rational and that all parameters(including payoff
functions) of the game are common knowledge. With these two assumptions, the players can
predict the outcome of the game. For this reason each player given the other players strategies is
in a position to choose the mixed strategy that gives him the maximum profit. A tuple of these
strategies is what we call “Nash Equilibrium”.
The existence of equilibria in mixed strategies was later extended to a class of incomplete
information finite games by Harsanyi (1967-1968), who assumed that the payoff matrix is not known
exactly but rather represents a random variable that is governed by a probability distribution known
to all players. In particular, Harsanyi assumed that a full prior distributional information for all
parameters of the game is available and that all players use this information in order to compute
the payoff functions of the game. This computation is made using the Bayes’ rule. For this reason
these games are called “Bayesian Games” and their equilibrium “Bayesian Nash Equilibrium”.
In 2006, Bertsimas and Aghassi [1] proposed a new class of distribution-free finite games where
the payoff matrix is only known to belong to a given uncertainty set. This model relaxes the distribu-
tional assumptions of Harsanyi’s Bayesian games, and it gives rise to an alternative distribution-free
equilibrium concept. Furthermore, in this model of games the players use a robust optimization
approach to the uncertainty and this assume to be a common knowledge. That is, given the other
players strategies each player tries to maximise his worst case expected payoff (worst case is taken
with respect to the uncertainty set). The using of the robust optimization approach is the reason
for calling these “Robust Games” and their equilibrium “Robust Optimization Equilibrium”.
In this thesis we present for the first time in the literature a new model of incomplete information
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games without private information in which the players use a distributionally robust optimization
approach to cope with payoff uncertainty. In our model players only have partial information
about the probability distribution of the uncertain payoff matrix. This information is expressed
through a commonly known ambiguity set of all distributions that are consistent with the known
distributional properties. Similar to the robust games framework, players in distributionally robust
games adopt a worst case approach. Only now the worst case is computed over all probability
distributions within the ambiguity set. More specifically we use a worst case CVaR(Conditional
Value at Risk) approach. This allows players to have several risk attitudes which make our model
even more coveted since in real life applications players rarely are risk neutral.
We also show that under specific assumptions about the ambiguity set and the values of risk
levels, Distributionally Robust Game constitutes a true generalization of the three aforementioned
finite games (Nash games, Bayesian Games and Robust Games). Subsequently, we prove that the
set of equilibria of an arbitrary distributionally robust game with specified ambiguity set and with-
out private information can be computed as the component-wise projection of the solution set of
a multi-linear system of equations and inequalities. Finally, we demonstrate the applicability of
Distributionally Robust Games to real life problems and highlight the importance of our model.
1.1 Structure and Contributions of the Thesis
The contributions of this thesis are structured as follows:
• In Chapter 2 we present the mathematical background that one needs to understand every
aspect of this work. We introduce the basic concepts of mathematical programming, risk
measures and game theory.
• Following that, in Chapter 3 we develop the basic theory of Robust Games and make a small
extension of the special class of these games. In the last section of this chapter, three different
methods for approximately computing sample equilibria of such games are implemented.
• The main contributions of our work are developed in Chapter 4. Here, we introduce and anal-
yse the new model of Distributionally Robust Games. We begin with the formulation of the
new model and show that any other existing finite game can be expressed as a distributionally
robust game with specific ambiguity set and values of the risk levels. In addition we prove the
equivalence of the set of equilibria of a distributionally robust game with the component-wise
projection of the solution set of multi-linear system of equation and inequalities. For special
cases of such games we also show equivalence to complete information finite games (Nash
Games) with the same number of players and same action spaces. Finally to concretize the
idea of a distributionallly robust game we present two examples.
• In Chapter 5 we present numerical results for 2-player Distributionally Robust Games. These
are the Distributionally robust Free Rider Game and the Distributionally Robust Inspection
Game. Our main objective is to study how the players’ payments change with small changes
of the unknown parameters.
• This project is concluded in Chapter 6, where we provide a brief summary of what we have
done and the possibilities of future research in this area.
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1.2 Notation
The following notations are used in the sequel:
• R denotes the set of real numbers
• Boldface upper case letters will denote matrices (e.g., P )
• Boldface lower case letters will denote vectors(e.g., x)
• ·˜ means that the input parameter (·), which can be either scalar, vector, or matrix, is subject
to uncertainty
• ·ˇ denotes the nominal counterpart of the uncertain coefficient ·˜
• [·]+ = max{·, 0} denotes the maximum value of · and zero.
• vec(A) denotes the column vector obtained by stacking the row vectors of the matrix A one
on top of the other.
General Hypothesis:
In order to avoid repeated gender distinctions (his or her) in the following thesis we present all
players as male decision makers.
Chapter 2
Mathematical Background
In this chapter we provide the necessary mathematical background required for the rest of the
thesis. We first present an overview of unconstrained optimization, continue with optimization
under uncertainty, discuss about risk measures and finish with the basic concepts of Game Theory.
2.1 Unconstrained Optimization
In this section we develop the basic theory that we will need for the experimentation part of section
(3.4). More specifically in this thesis we will focus on solving unconstrained optimization
problem of the following form:
min
x∈Rn
f(x) (2.1)
The most common way to solve this kind of problem is to denote a starting point x0 ∈ Rn and
then find a sequence of points x0, x1, ....xn.. where f(xk+1) ≤ f(xk). The goal in this method is
to find a point xk in the sequence that satisfied ∇f(xk) = 0. This point is the desired solution, the
point that minimize the function f(x). In practice find a point with this property is very rare so we
assume that our sequence converge to the minimum if one of the following constraints is satisfied:
• ‖ ∇f(x) ‖≤ ε1
• ‖ xk+1− xk ‖≤ ε2
• ‖ f(xk+1)− f(xk) ‖≤ ε3
where εi for i = 1, 2, 3 are tolerance parameters.
There are two fundamental strategies for moving from the current point xk to the new iterate
xk+1 of the sequence. These are line search method and trust region method. In this thesis we will
develop only different approaches of the first method. An interesting reader can refer to [45], [14]
[6] for more details about optimization algorithms.
In the line search strategy the algorithm chooses a direction dk and searches along this, from
the current iterate xk for a new iterate that give lower value to the function f(x).The distance that
algorithm uses to move along dk it depends on the step size ak that each algorithm use.
Consider this, we can understand that each new iteration is described by:
xk+1 = xk + akdk (2.2)
More of the line search algorithms required the direction to be descent, that is to has
∇f(xk)τdk ≤ 0
.
In general the direction dk has the following form:
dk = −(Ak)−1∇f(xk) (2.3)
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where the matrix Ak is symmetric and invertible, and take different values depending on the line
search algorithm that we use. In the steepest descent algorithm Ak is the identity matrix and in
the Newton method is the Hessian matrix of the requested function. Finally in the Quasi Newton
method Ak is an approximation of the Hessian matrix and is updated in every iteration.
Selection of Step size ak
There are many ways to calculate the step-size ak in each iteration. Here we develop the two that
we use in this thesis. For more details about the most widely in practice rules for choosing step-size
we suggest [6].
1. Exact Line Search:
ak ∈ argmin
ak
f(xk + akdk) (2.4)
In this rule ak is chosen to be the value which minimize the f(xk+1) in each iteration.
2. Armijo Rule: In this rule the step size s is chosen (most of the times s = 1) and then check
if f(xk + sdk) ≤ f(xk). If this is not the case s is reduced repentantly until the value of f
at xk+1 is less than f(xk). The formula for this is:
f(xk)− f(xk + βmsdk) ≥ −σβms∇f(xk)′dk (2.5)
where s, β, σ are fixed positive scalars with β ∈ (0, 1) and σ ∈ (0, 1) and the step size ak = βms
where m is the first no-negative integer (m = 0, 1, 2, 3, ...) which satisfies the equation (2.5).
In the rest of this section the three basic methods of line search strategy that we have already
mentioned are developed.
2.1.1 Steepest Descent Method
One of the basic and more simple in concept algorithm for solving an unconstrained optimization
problem is the Steepest Descent.
In this algorithm as we understand from the previous analysis the transition to the next point is
equal to:
xk+1 = xk − ak∇f(xk)τ (2.6)
where ak and dk = −∇f(xk)τ denote the step size and the descent direction respectively. For
this choice of direction the method is called steepest since −∇f(x)is the direction of the greatest
decrease.
Explanation: We know by definition that the rate of increase f along direction d is:
< ∇f(x),d >= ∇f(xk)τd where‖d‖ = 1 (2.7)
By Cauchy-Shwarz inequality,
< ∇f(x),d >≤ ‖∇f(x)‖‖d‖ = ‖∇f(x)‖ (2.8)
Rate of increase is not possible to be greater than ‖∇f(x)‖, so if we choose as direction the
dk = ∇f(x) we achieve the greatest increase. Therefore when dk = −∇f(x) we obtain the greatest
decrease.
Advantages of Steepest descent:
• Easy to implement
• Only requires first order information
Main disadvantage:
Steepest Descent is one of the most slower methods for solving unconstrained problems. The
convergence is very slow.
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2.1.2 Newton-Raphson Method
To overcome the slower convergence of steepest descent method a new algorithm which is more
effective and faster was created. The Newton-Raphson method used except the first derivative and
the second one and indeed perform better of the steepest descent if the starting point x0 is close
to the minimizer. The main idea behind the formula that this algorithm used for the transition to
the next point is the following:
Compute a quadratic approximation of f(x).
f(x) ≈ f(xk) +∇f(xk)τ (x− xk) + 1
2
(x− xk)τ∇2f(xk)(x− xk) , q(x) (2.9)
Applying the First Order Necessary Condition (FONC) to q(x) yields:
0 = ∇q(x) = ∇f(xk) +∇2f(xk)(x− xk) (2.10)
Thus if we assume that the matrix ∇2f(xk) is positive definite we obtain the following formula
for the transition to the next point of the sequence
xk+1 = xk − ak∇2f(xk)−1∇f(xk) (2.11)
By equation (2.11) can deduce, that the Newton-Raphson is a descent algorithm with a descent
direction given by:
dk = −∇2f(xk)−1∇f(xk) (2.12)
Disadvantages of Newton-Raphson method:
• The method is not guaranteed to converge from any starting point x0(usually only locally
convergence can be guaranteed)
• In regions where the function f is linear the method could break down because the inverse of
the Hessian matrix ∇2f(xk)−1 may fail to exists
• The computation of the exact value of the Hessian matrix in each iteration could be time
consuming.
2.1.3 Quasi Newton Methods, BFGS
All these drawbacks of the previous methods were eliminated when a new approach for solving the
unconstrained optimization problem were proposed, the Quasi Newton methods. These algorithms
are globally convergent and they not use the Hessian matrix but an approximation of this so they
are also more computational beneficial compare to the simple newton method.
The general formula that all quasi newton methods use for find the next iteration in the sequence
is:
xk+1 = xk − akHk∇f(xk) (2.13)
where Hk is the positive definite approximation matrix of the Hessian matrix of the function f(x).
The most popular quasi newton algorithms are the DFP algorithm and the BFGS algorithm.
The second one suggested independently in 1970 by Broyden [13], Fletcher [18], Goldfarb [23] and
Shanno [39] and this one we used in our implementation in section (3.4).
The steps of the BFGS Algorithm are the following:
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1. First we choose the value of the starting point x0 and a real symmetric positive definite
matrix H0
2. if ∇f(xk) = 0 stop otherwise ∇f(xk) = −Hk∇f(xk)
3. Calulate the
ak = argmax
a≥0
f(xk + adk) (2.14)
xk+1 = xk + akdk (2.15)
4. Estimate the
∆xk = xk+1 − xk (2.16)
∆(∇f(xk)) = ∇f(xk+1)−∇f(xk) (2.17)
5. Calulate the
Hk+1 = Hk + (1 +
∆(∇f(xk))τHk∆(∇f(xk))
∆(∇f(xk))τ∆xk )
∆xk∆xk
τ
∆xkτ∆(∇f(xk))
−Hk∆(∇f(xk))∆xk
τ + (Hk∆(∇f(xk))∆xkτ )τ
∆(∇f(xk))τ∆xk
(2.18)
6. set k=k+1 and go back to step 2.
2.2 Optimization Under Uncertainty
Organisations frequently need to take decisions based on uncertain or incomplete information (e.g.,
about future customer demands, raw material prices or exchange rates). Failure to take this un-
certain parameters into consideration may lead to suboptimal unwanted decisions. In this section
we present two of the most widely used approaches which address practical optimization problems
affected by uncertainty. These are the Robust Optimization approach and the Distributionally
Robust Optimization approach.
2.2.1 Robust Optimization
Not surprisingly, decision-making under uncertainty has a long and distinguished history in Op-
erations Research. Until now in many research papers decision problems under uncertainty are
solved by modelling uncertain data as random variables and then analysing and discretising the
outcomes of these random variables. This way, however, has several disadvantages. Firstly, the
probability distribution governing the random variables is typically unknown and has to be esti-
mated from historical observations. Moreover the aforementioned discretisation implies that the
computation times grow exponentially with problem size. The above-mentioned two drawbacks
have been a major impediment to the applicability of quantitative approaches to decision-making
under uncertainty.
Nowadays, both shortcomings have been addressed by a novel methodology termed robust
optimisation. With different techniques robust optimisation avoids the aforementioned curse of
dimensionality. Hence, this approach seems to be ideally suited for practical decision problems that
are large-scale and subject to significant uncertainty.
To grasp the main concept of robust optimization approach for solving problems with parameters
under uncertainty, let us consider the following mathematical optimization problem:
minimize
x∈Rn
f0(x,u)
subject to fi(x,u) ≤ 0 i ∈ {1, 2, ..m}
x ∈ X .
(2.19)
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In this problem x ∈ Rn denotes the vector of decision variables. It is the vector that we must
compute, with respect the m constraints fi(x,u), in order to find the minimum value of the ob-
jective function f0(x). The functions f0 and fi are f : Rn −→ R and vector u ∈ Rt take specific
known value (it is fixed). Note that both objective function f0 and the constraints function fi
depend on the fixed vector u.
Now, lets assume that u˜ ∈ Rt is a random vector. With this assumption we obtain the following
robust counterpart of the previous nominal problem.
minimize
x∈Rn
max
u∈U
f0(x,u)
subject to fi(x,u) ≤ 0, ∀u ∈ U ⊆ Rt
x ∈ X .
(2.20)
Our goal in the robust counterpart, is to compute the vector of decision variables x that min-
imise the objective function max
u∈U
f0(x,u) which represents the worst case scenario. In this case,
we must also consider all possible constraints that the disturbance of u˜ could create.Under this
approach we must be willing to accept a suboptimal solution to our problem in order to make sure
that the solution remains feasible for all nominal problems.
At this point, it is worth noting the following two remarks about the robust counterpart:
Remark 2.2.1. We could assume without loss of generality that the objective function is not
affected by the uncertainty of the parameters.That happen because we can always reformulate
the optimisation problem in such a way that makes the objective function uncertainty-free. (See
Berstimas-Caramanis [7]).
Remark 2.2.2. It is obvious that the case of constraints without uncertainty is subsumed in the
robust counterparts by assuming that the uncertainty set U is singleton.
Tractability of Robust Counterpart
With the introduction of the potential huge number of constraints in the robust counterpart of
a nominal problem, one can think that this kind of modelling is intractable. In general, this is
true, but in this thesis and in the most papers of the literature about robust optimization we deal
with tractable problems1. We achieved tractability by using specifying classes of fi and specific
uncertainty sets Ui.
The main categories of tractable robust optimization problems are robust linear optimization,
robust quadratic optimization, robust semi-definite optimization and robust discrete optimization.
In this thesis we focus on robust linear optimization problems and more specifically on the case
that the uncertainty sets are bounded polyhedral.
When we refer to Robust Linear Optimization we mean the problem which the robust counter-
part of linear optimization problem is:
minimize
x∈Rn
cτx
subject to Ax ≤ b ∀ai ∈ U i = 1, . . . ,m.
(2.21)
Where A ∈ Rm×n is the uncertainty coefficient matrix and ai are the i row of the matrix A.
1In computational complexity theory, tractable problem is the problem that can be solved in polynomial time
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Furthermore, when we specify even more to robust linear optimization with bounded polyhe-
dral uncertainty set we assume that the uncertainty set U (following the notation from [9]) has the
following form:
U = {A|F vec(A) ≤ d} (2.22)
where F ∈ R1×mn and vec(A) ∈ Rmn×1 is the column vector obtained by stacking the row
vectors of the matrix A one on top of the other.
From the first approach of Soyster [41] in 1973 the robust optimization has been drawing a
lot of attention from researchers mainly because of its tractability. For developing a more sophis-
ticated understanding of the robust optimisation approach the reader may refer to Ben-Tal and
Nemirovski[4], [5] , El Ghaoui [16],[17],Bertsimas and Sim [10], [11], Bertsimas Pachamonova and
Sim [9]. Finally for a thorough discussion, we suggest the [3] of Ben-Tal, El Ghaoui and Nemirovski,
which gives an excellent and stimulating account of the classical and advanced results in this field.
2.2.2 Distrinutionally Robust Optimization
In robust optimization approach we mentioned that the decision maker is not aware or choose to
ignore any probability distribution of the random vector u˜. He make a decision based on the worst
case scenario, of all possible values of the uncertainty vector u˜, that belong in an uncertainty set.
The distributionally robust optimization approach is closely related to robust optimization frame-
work but now the decision maker instead of uncertainty set has partial information about the
probability distribution Q of the random vector. With this approach one does not know the true
probability distribution of the random variable of interest, but instead, attempts to create bounds
within which the true distribution should lie in, based on available data. Then, to guard against
the uncertainty of where the true distribution lies within these bounds, one makes decisions that
are optimal with respect to the worst distribution in this set.
Let F denote the ambiguity set of all distributions Q that satisfy the known distributional proper-
ties. Then the distributionally robust counterpart of the nominal problem (2.19) is the following:
minimize
x∈Rn
sup
Q∈F
EQ[f0(x, u˜)]
subject to Q[fi(x, u˜) ≤ 0] ≥ ε ∀Q ∈ F
x ∈ X .
(2.23)
The objective function sup
Q∈F
EQ[f0(x, u˜)] of the distributionally robust counterpart represents
the worst case scenario of the ambiguity set. In this problem the decision maker try to minimise
the expected value of function [f0(x, u˜)] of the worst case distribution. Furthermore, in the distri-
butionally robust problem the uncertain constraints must be satisfied with high probability. The ε
in the formulation denotes the risk factor of this probability and it is obvious that as the value of
ε decrease then the constraint has to be satisfied with lower probability. ( ε ∈ (0, 1))
The distributionally robust optimization, through the freedom of choosing the right dis-utility
functions fi captures the risk attitude of the decision maker. In addition, through the examination
of all distributions of the ambiguity set in order to find the worst distribution, distributionally
robust approach expresses an aversion towards ambiguity( for details see [44]). These are the two
main advantages that make the distributionallly robust optimization one of the main tools that the
operational research analysts use to overcome the noisy and incomplete data.
For a thorough discussion on distributionally robust optimization the reader may refer to [38],
[21], [8],[22] [15] and [44] which are considered important milestones of the area.
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2.3 Risk Measures
In the area of financial mathematics and financial risk management, risk measures can be divided
into two main categories: the moment-based and the quantile based risk measures (see [34]). One
can understand this separation in these two categories by thinking that the first one is related to
classical utility theory and that the second has created as a need after the continuously development
theory of stochastic dominance theory. In this thesis we will not use moment-based risk measures.
For familiarity with this kind of measures, and more specifically with the Mean-Variance which
is the most popular measure of this category we suggest the reading of the pioneering work of
Markowitz [31].
In this section we describe the two most widely used quantile risk measures: the Value at
Risk(VaR) and the Conditional Value at Risk(CVaR).
2.3.1 Value At Risk
The most widely used quantile based risk measure is the Value at Risk [27].
VaRε is defined as the (1− ε)-quantile of the loss distribution L (typically ε is equal to 1% or 5%).
That is, VaRε is the smallest number x for which the probability that loss distribution L exceeds
x is not larger than ε:
VaRε(L) = inf{x ∈ R : P(L ≥ x) ≤ ε} (2.24)
To get more intuitively understanding of what Value at Risk represents and how we can estimate
its value lets consider the following example:
Example 2.3.1. (from [26])
Suppose that the outcomes of a project are between a gain of $50 million and a loss of $50 million
and all are equally considered. For this reason the distribution of loss is a uniform distribution
from −$50 million to +$50 million. We want to find the value for which there is 1% chance to loss
greater than $49 million. This is equivalent to the V aR1 from the above definition. Therefore is
equivalent to $49 million.
2.3.2 Conditional Value at Risk
Another quantile-based measure of risk is the Conditional Value at Risk which firstly introduce by
Rockafellar and Uryasev (see [36] and [37]). It has been gaining popularity due to its attractive
computational properties and to its very desirable property that is a coherent risk measure (see
[2]).
CVaRε of a loss distribution L is the expected value of all losses that exceed (1− ε)-quantile of the
distribution. As we mention before this (1− ε)-quantile is the VaRε of the loss distribution.
Conditional Value at Risk can be formalized as:
Q-CVaRε(L) = min
ζ∈R
ζ +
1
ε
EQ[L− ζ]+ (2.25)
where [x]+ = max{x, 0}.
More Important Properties of CVar:
• CVaRε of a loss distribution increases as ε decreases and vice versa.
• For ε = 1 the Conditional Value at Risk is equivalent to the expected value of the loss
distribution.
Distributionally Robust Game Theory 19
• It can be shown that CVaRε(L) is always greater than the VaRε(L). For this reason CVaR
is often used as a conservative approximation of VaR(see [37])
• CVaRε is a coherent risk measure [2].
The new model of Games that we propose in this thesis is very relevant with the concept of the
CVaR. Hence, the CVaR risk measure will be considerably used , throughout this thesis.
2.4 Game Theory
Game theory could be considered the field of mathematics and economics that has witnessed the
most explosive growth the last century. It is the study of multi-person decision problems, in which
the payoff of each person(player) of the game, depends not only on his chosen strategy but also on
the strategies of the other players.
The reason of this explosive growth, is the number of real life applications that could be for-
mulated using game theoretical models. For example, in the area of economics and business, game
theory is used for modelling competing behaviours of interacting agents (auctions, bargaining,
mergers and acquisitions pricing). Models of game theory could also describe applications in po-
litical science in which the players are voters, special interest groups, and politicians. In biology,
games have been used for better understanding of several phenomena like evolution and animal
communication. Furthermore, games play an increasingly important role in logic and computer
science (on-line algorithms, algorithmic game theory, algorithmic mechanism design).
Depending on the problem that we have to solve, several types of games have been proposed.
Each of this type can described by specific characteristics. For example if the players can commu-
nicate and they could make agreements about their chosen strategies the game called cooperative.
Contrary, in non-cooperative games, this communication is not possible. In particular, in this thesis
we focus on non-cooperative, simultaneous-move, one shot, finite games with complete information
or incomplete information. “Simultaneous-move” means that the strategies that adopted by the
players are chosen simultaneously. That is, the players are not aware of their opponents’ strategies
before choose their own strategies. “One shot” refers to the fact that the game is played only one
time. Finally, “Finite” denotes that the number of players and the number of their possible actions
are finite.
In this section we present the basic theory of finite game with complete(Nash Games) and
finite games with incomplete information(Bayesian Games). For more information about these two
categories of games and their many applications the reader may refer to [20], [19] and [35].
2.4.1 Finite Games with Complete Information
“Complete Information” refers to the fact that all parameters of the game including individual
players’ payoff functions are common knowledge. Thus, all players know exactly the payoffs that
the other players will receive for any combinations of strategies.
More specifically, in this section we focus in how we can present this type of games (Normal Form
Representation) and how we can solve the resulting game-theoretic problem (Dominated Strategies,
Nash Equilibrium).
Games in Normal Form
Let us begin with a standard representation of a game, which is known as a normal form represen-
tation. This is the most conveniently handled way to represent the complete information games
and through this we could later identify the dominated strategies and Nash equilibrium. To define
the normal-form representation of a game, we need to specify the number of players, the available
strategies of each player, and the players’ payoffs.
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Definition 2.4.1. (Normal Form Representation):
In static games of complete information, a normal-form representation is a specification of players’
strategy spaces and payoff functions. In particular, a game G is considered to be in a normal form
representation if it consists of N = 1, 2, ...., n players, one set Si for each player i which denote his
strategy space (si denote an arbitrary member of this set) and from one function ui(s1, s2, ..., sn)
which represent the payoff of player i if the players play the strategies s1, s2, ..., sn. We denote
this game by G = {S1, S2, ....Sn;u1, u2, ....un}.
Normal form games are often represented and are more understandable by their matrix form
(a table). This can be clarified by the following example.
Example 2.4.1. (Normal Form Representation):
Table 2.1: A normal form Game
Left Right
Left (5,3) (4,6)
Right (2,2) (1,2)
Player 2
P
la
y
e
r
1
This matrix is a normal-form representation of a game in which players move simultaneously
(or at least do not observe the other player’s move before making their own) and receive the payoffs
as specified for the combinations of actions played. For example, if player 1 plays Left and player
2 plays Right, player 1 receives 4 and player 2 receives 6. In each cell, the first number represents
the payoff to the row player (in this case player 1), and the second number represents the payoff
to the column player (in this case player 2).
Although, normal form representation of a game may look trivial it is very important for the
intuitively understanding of the game and very helpful in the procedure of solving it. As we
mentioned before, there are two ways of solving games with complete information
• Iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies and
• Nash Equilibrium
In this thesis we focus on solutions with Nash Equilibrium, hence in this subsection we present
only the definition of the Dominated strategies and the disadvantages of the Iterated elimination
method. For a comprehensive review (theory and examples) of this method we suggest [20].
Definition 2.4.2. (Strictly Dominated Strategy):
In the normal-form game G = {S1, S2, ....Sn;u1, u2, ....un}, let s′i and si” be feasible strategies for
player i (i.e.s′i and si” are members of Si). Strategy s
′
i is strictly dominated by strategy si” if
for each feasible combination of the other players’ strategies, i’s payoff from playing s′i is strictly
less than i’s payoff from playing si” :
ui(s1, s2, ..si−1, s′i, si+1.., sn) < ui(s1, s2, ..si−1, si”, si+1.., sn)
for each (s1, s2, ..si−1, si+1.., sn) that can be constructed from the other players’ strategy spaces
S1, S2, ....Sn.
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From the above definition (2.4.2) and assuming that all players of the game are rational we
could perceive that no one of the players will play any strictly dominated strategy. Using this
assumption we can solve a game by a process called iterated elimination of strictly dominated
strategies. With this method we simply cross out all the strictly dominated strategies (in the pay-
oof matrix) of each player consecutively. (For example see [20])
Drawbacks of the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies:
1. To use this method we can not only assume that players are rational but we also have to
make the assumption that this fact is a common knowledge. That is, for the elimination of
one strategy each player has to assume that all the other players have rational behaviour and
that all of them knows that he is also a rational player.
2. The process often produces a very inaccurate prediction about the play of the game. The
possibility that non of the nominated strategies can be eliminated it is large so we can have
a game which this method does not give us a specific solution.
For these limitations, the concept of Nash Equilibrium is considered a stronger solution concept
than the strictly dominated strategies.
Definition 2.4.3. (Best Response, (from [1]) )
A player’s strategy is called a best response to the other players’ strategies if, given the latter,
he has no incentive to unilaterally deviate from his aforementioned strategy.
Definition 2.4.4. (Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies)
In the n-player normal-form game G = {S1, S2, ....Sn;u1, u2, ....un}, the strategies s∗1, s∗2, ....s∗n are
a Nash equilibrium if, for each player i, si∗ is player i’s best response to the strategies specified
for the n− 1 other players, s∗1, ...s∗i−1, s∗i+1, ...., s∗n:
ui(s
∗
1, ...s
∗
i−1, s
∗
i , s
∗
i+1, ...., s
∗
n) < ui(s
∗
1, ...s
∗
i−1, si, s
∗
i+1, ...., s
∗
n)
for every feasible strategy siin Si; that is, si∗ solves max ui(s∗1, ...s∗i−1, s∗i , s∗i+1, ...., s∗n).
To be more concrete and fully understand the concept of Pure Nash Equilibrium, we present
two of the most known examples of the Game Theory literature(The battle of the sexes and the
Matching Pennies).
Example 2.4.2. (The battle of the sexes): Game with two Nash Equilibrium in Pure Strategies
Table 2.2: The battle of the Sexes
Ballet Football
Ballet (2,1) (0,0)
Football (0,0) (1,2)
Player 2
P
la
y
e
r
1
In the battle of the sexes the scenario of our game is the following. There are two players which
are couple. Lets say that player 1 is the man and player two is the woman and they are planning
where they will meet for their first date. Both players want to have a date, but man prefers a night
at the ballet show and woman prefers the football match (weird preferences). If they choose to meet
at the ballet show then man and woman have profits equal to 2 and 1 respectively. If if they choose
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football match then we have exactly the opposites payoffs. If they do not make an agreement about
the place they stay home and get both 0 as a profit.(see Table 2.2) Using definition (2.4.4) we
can find that in this game we have two Pure Nash Equilibrium, the one that both players choose
to attend in ballet and the other one that they will choose to meet to the football match. For
example, the combination of strategies (Ballet,Ballet) is a Nash equilibrium because both players
respond to their component using their best response(definition (2.4.3)). If player 1 knows that
player 2 will choose Ballet then the Ballet is the best response to his component strategy because
the football give him payoff equal to 0 instead of 2.
Although the solution concept of the previous definition of Pure Nash Equilibrium produces
tight predictions in a very broad class of games, there are simple games in which we could not find
any Nash Equilibrium. For this reason we must extend this definition.
Example 2.4.3. (Matching Pennies): Game without Nash Equilibrium in Pure Strategies
The following game is played by two players and each one of them has two possible actions, Heads
or Tails. Each player has a penny and he through it. If the two coins match(both Heads or both
Tails) the player 2 wins one penny and the player 1 loses. If the result is Heads in the one coin and
Tails in the other, then the opposite happen. Again by the definition of best response and Nash
Equilibrium we realize that this game has no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.For example the
combination of strategies (Heads,Heads) is not Nash Equilibrium because if the player 1 know that
player 2 will play Heads then he will prefer to choose Tails in order to improve his payoff from -1
to 1.
Table 2.3: Matching Pennies
Heads Tails
Heads (-1,1) (1,-1)
Tails (1,-1) (-1,1)
Player 2
P
la
y
e
r
1
Mixed Strategies
As we have showed in the previous example (2.4.3) a game in normal-form representation does not
always have a Nash equilibrium in which each player deterministically chooses one of his strate-
gies(pure strategies).In the game of Matching Pennies none of the possible combinations of ”pure
strategies” is Nash Equilibrium. This happen because for every combination, one of the two players
prefers to switch his aforementioned strategy.
Like the Gibbons quotes in [20]:”In any game which each player would like to outguess the other
there is no Nash equilibrium (in Pure strategies) because the solution to such game necessarily
involves uncertainty about what the players will do”.
For this reason we have to introduce the notion of mixed strategies.
Up to this point, we assume that all players choose a “pure strategy” which means that they
just pick one of their possible actions. With the mixed strategy concept each player i has the right
to select a strategy which could be also a probability distribution over his possible pure strategies si.
Definition 2.4.5. (Mixed Strategy): In the normal-form game G = {S1, S2, ....Sn;u1, u2, ....un}, a
strategy of a player i is called mixed strategy if it is a probability distribution pi = (pi1, ..., pik)
over the strategy space Si = {si1, ...., sik}. Each pij denotes the probability of player i, choose
the pure strategy sj of the strategy space Si where j ∈ {1, 2, .....k} , 0 < pij < 1 and pi1+...+pik = 1.
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In all previous examples the players allowed to use only pure strategies. For this reason, for
each tuple of strategies, the amount of the payoff function for each player it was simply be the
corresponding value of the payoff matrix. With the introduction of mixed strategies we understand
that this is not always the case. The players now are not restricted to choose only one specific
action from their strategy space but instead they have the right to select a probability distribution
over their possible actions. Thus, we will need to make some calculations in order to compute the
payoff of each player instead of simply take it from the payoff matrix.
Calculations of the payoffs if the players use mixed strategies
Let Si = {si1, si2, ...., siHi} denotes the strategy space of player i and Hi denotes the number of
possible actions of player i(the possible pure strategies). The arbitrary pure strategy of player i is
sik where k ∈ {1, 2, ....,Hi}. If player i ∈ {1, 2, ....n} believes that all other players j ∈ {1, 2, ..i−
1, i + 1, ...n} will play the strategies (sj1, sj2, ...., sjHj )with probabilities pj = (pj1, ..., pjHj ) then
players i’s expected payoff from playing the pure strategy sij is:
k =
H1∑
h1=1
H2∑
h2=1
...
Hi−1∑
hi−1=1
Hi+1∑
hi+1=1
...
HN∑
hN=1
p1h1p2h2..p(i−1)hi−1p(i+1)hi+1 ..pNhNui(s1h1, .., sij, ..sNhN )
(2.26)
and players i’expected payoff from playing the mixed strategy pi = (pj1, ..., pjHj ) is:
ui(p1, p2, ....pn) =
Hi∑
hi=1
pihi [k]
=
H1∑
h1=1
H2∑
h2=1
...
Hi−1∑
hi−1=1
Hi+1∑
hi+1=1
...
HN∑
hN=1
p1h1p2h2..p(i−1)hi−1pihip(i+1)hi+1 ..pNhNui(s1h1, .., sij, ..sNhN )
(2.27)
Now that we have shown how we can find the payoff of each player when mixed strategies are
allowed we can extend the Nash equilibrium concept to include mixed strategies. The extension is
simple. We simply use the same idea as before. We require that the mixed strategy of each
player must be the best response to the given mixed strategies of the other players.
This extension of Nash Equilibrium includes the earlier one from definition (2.4.4) since we can
express every pure strategy as a mixed strategy. It is the strategy which has 1 only at one coordi-
nate of the probability distribution(the one corresponds to the playing action) and zeros to all the
other coordinates.
In n player game a tuple of mixed strategies (p∗1, p∗2, ...p∗i ..., p
∗
n) is a Nash equilibrium if p
∗
i
satisfy
ui(p
∗
1, p
∗
2, ...p
∗
i .., p
∗
n) ≥ ui(p∗1, p∗2, .., pi, ..., p∗n) ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ....n}
for every probability distribution pi over the strategy space Si. This means that the mixed strat-
egy of each player is best response to other players’ strategies. A player, given the other players
strategies, has no reason to unilaterally deviate from his aforementioned strategy.
To illustrate the above theoretical part of the mixed strategies we extend the example (2.4.2)
of Battle of the Sexes, and allow players to choose mixed strategies.
Example 2.4.4. (Battle of the sexes): Game with two Nash Equilibrium in Pure Strategies but
with another one Equilibrium in Mixed Strategies.
As previously discussed the known example of battle of the sexes have two Pure Nash equilib-
ria(equilibria in pure strategies). Now lets assume that the players can also opt mixed strategies.
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Let p1 = (x, 1− x) be the mixed strategy in which player 1 plays Ballet with probability x and
let p2 = (y, 1− y) the mixed strategy in which player 2 plays Ballet with probability y. By using
these two mixed strategies we get the following payoffs.
Payoff of player 1:
u1(p1, p2) = 2xy + (1− x)(1− y) = (3y − 1)x+ 1− y
Therefore the payoff of player 1 for x ∈ [0, 1] corresponds to a line segment which its gradient and
its section with the vertical axis depends on the mixed strategy y ∈ [0, 1] of player 2. If the gradient
is positive then the maximum payoff of player 1 it will be at x = 1, if gradient is negative at x = 0
and if the gradient is equal to zero then the payoff of the first player is become maximum for all
x ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, the best response of player 1 to the mixed strategy of player 2 is:
u1(p1, p2) =

0 if y  1/3
[0, 1] if y = 1/3.
1 if y  1/3
with similar way we could find that the payoff of player 2:
u2(p1, p2) = xy + 2(1− x)(1− y) = (3x− 2)y + 2(1− x)
is the best response to the mixed strategy of player 1 and
u2(p1, p2) =

0 if x  2/3
[0, 1] if x = 2/3.
1 if x  2/3
From the above,we can easily conclude that one tuple of strategies (p1, p2) is a Nash equilibrium
if corresponds to point of intersection of the two payoff functions u1(p1, p2) and u2(p1, p2) and
vice versa. In our example we have three equilibria. In particular, there are two equilibria in pure
strategies: (x, y) = (0, 0) and (x, y) = (1, 1) and one equilibrium in mixed strategies: (x, y) =
(2/3, 1/3).
Example 2.4.5. This is how a Graphical Representation of a game looks like:
Figure 2.1: Example of a Graphical representation of a two player game. The Nash equilibria are exactly the inter-
sections of the best responses. In this example there are three points of intersection which are the equilibria. (x, y) =
(0, 1), (x, y) = (1, 0) and (x, y) = (p′, p′). Image taken from http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Reaction-
correspondence-hawk-dove.jpg
We conclude this section with the now very famous theorem of Nash who showed that any finite
complete information game has an equilibrium if players can play mixed strategies.
Theorem 2.4.1. Nash(1950): In the n-player normal-form game G = {Si, S2, ...Sn;u1, u2, ....un}
if n is finite and Si is finite for every i and the players allowed to choose mixed strategies then there
exists at least one Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Nash gave two proofs for this theorem one in [33] based in Kakutamis Fixed Point The-
orem [28] and one in [32] based on the Brouwer’s Fixed point [12].
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2.4.2 Finite Games with Incomplete Information - Bayesian Games
In the previous section we discussed about games with complete information, which means that all
the parameters that structure the game are known from all players. Therefore the payoff functions
are common knowledge. However in the real world situations, players are often uncertain about
some aspects of the game’s structure.
Harsanyi in [25] managed to model these incomplete information games and with the intro-
duction of the notion of “type” he expressed the uncertainty of a player about the other players’
payoff functions.
Understanding of “Types”
More specifically, Harsanyi introduced a set of types Ti for each player i. This set consists from
a finite number of possible types ti, which each one of them corresponds to a specific payoff
ui(a1, .....an; ti). Therefore, by saying that player i knows his payoff function is equivalent to
say that he knows his type.
By using types, the need to establish a new, in some way extended(compare to the complete
information games), notation is created.
With ui(a1, .....an; ti), we express the payoff function of player i when he knows his type ti and
when the player j ∈ {1, 2, ...., n} choose to play the strategy aj . The types of the others players
except player i denoted by: t−i = (t1, t2, ....ti−1, ti+1, ., tn) and with pi(t−i|ti) we express the belief
of player i about the types of the other players.
The notion of belief, is also due to Harsanyi who suggested that the players of an incomplete
information game share a common knowledge prior probability distribution over types. Given this
distribution and with the knowledge of his own type, each player could derive his beliefs about the
types of all other players using the Bayes rule. Exactly for this application of the Bayes rule these
games called, by Harsanyi, ”Bayesian Games”.
Definition 2.4.6. (Normal Form representation of Bayesian Games)
In Bayesian Games, a normal-form representation of a game is a specification of players’ action
spaces A1, ....An (where with actions we denote all possible actions including the probability distri-
butions over all possible pure actions), the type spaces T1, ....., Tn, the beliefs of all players p1....pn
and the payoff functions u1....un.In particular, a Bayesian game G is considered to be in normal
form representation if it consists of N = 1, 2, ...., n players, one set Ti for each player i which denote
his type space (ti denote an arbitrary member of this set) and from one function ui(a1, a2, ..., an)
which represent the payoff of player i if the players play the actions a1, a2, ..., an. Player i’s belief,
(p1(t−i|ti)) describes i’s uncertainty about the n− 1 other players’ possible types,t−i (given i’s own
type, ti).We denote this game by G = {A1, ....An;T1, ....., Tn; p1....pn;u1....un}.
When we developed the theory of complete information games we mentioned that the players
simultaneously choose their actions and then they receive their expected payoffs. In Bayesian
Games this is not the case because we have the concept of private information which means
that the players know their own payoff function but they are uncertain for the types of all other
players. For this reason the procedure until the receiving of the expected payoffs in Bayesian games
is presented by the following four main stages:
1. We assume (following Harsanyi’s model, [25]) that nature is in the game. Nature draws a
type vector t = (t1, ....., tn),where ti is drawn from the set of possible types Ti. There is a
probability distribution over types, known to all players with which nature choose this specific
type vector.
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2. Then, nature reveals ti to player i but not to any other player(private information)
3. After that, the players simultaneously choose actions (player i choosing ai, from the feasible
set Ai).
4. Finally the payoffs ui(a1, .....an; ti) are received.
Like the complete information game, to introduce the concept of Nash equilibrium in Bayesian
game we must first present the definition of strategy.
Definition 2.4.7. (Strategy in Bayesian Games)
In static Bayesian game G = {A1, ....An;T1, ....., Tn; p1....pn;u1....un}, strategy of player i is the
function si : Ti −→ Ai. For each type ti, in Ti ,si(ti) specifies the mixed strategy from the feasible
set Ai that type ti, would choose if drawn by nature.
Again, like any other game the idea behind the Equilibrium concept is the same: A tuple of
strategies is said to be equilibrium if each player’s strategy is best response to the other player’s
strategies.
Definition 2.4.8. (Bayesian Nash Equilibrium)
In the static Bayesian game G = {A1, ....An;T1, ....., Tn; p1....pn;u1....un}, the tuple of mixed
strategies (s∗1, ..., s∗n) is Bayesian Nash equilibrium if for each player i and for each type ti ∈ Ti
of i, s∗i (ti) solves:
max
ai∈Ai
∑
t−i∈T−i
ui(s
∗
1(t1), ....s
∗
i−1(ti−1), ai, s
∗
i+1(ti+1)...., s
∗
1(tn); t)pi(t−i|ti)
With other words, for any player i ∈ {1, 2, ...N} the s∗i (ti) is the mixed strategy that gives him
the maximum value in his payoff function. For this reason no one of the players wants to change
his strategy even if this changing is only for one action in any type.
Theorem 2.4.2. (Existence of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium):
Every Finite Bayesian Game G = {A1, ....An;T1, ....., Tn; p1....pn;u1....un} has a Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium.
Proof: in [25].
Subsequently to make the concept of Bayesian Games more comprehensive, we point some re-
marks, that following from one concrete example.
Remark 2.4.1. A very important assumption is that the strategy spaces, the payoff functions,
the possible types and the prior probability distribution over types are all common knowledge.
That is, the players know every aspect of the game except the type that nature reveals to each
player.
Remark 2.4.2. By using the prior probability distribution and the knowledge of his type, each
player can compute his beliefs pi(t−i|ti) about the other player’s types. That is, given his type,
each player can estimate all elements of the type vector using the Bayes rule:
pi(t−i|ti) = pi(t−i, ti)
pi(ti)
=
pi(t−i, ti)∑
t−i∈T−i pi(t−i, ti)
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Example 2.4.6. (Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in the Battle of the Sexes)
The example that we present is taken from the lecture notes of MIT course ”Game Theory with
Engineering Application” of Dr Asu Ozdaglar.2
Lets recall the example of the Battle of the Sexes from the previous section. In this game we
have found that there are two pure strategy equilibria and one mixed strategy equilibria. Now lets
change it, and assume that player 2 has two equal probability choices. He can choose if he want
to meet or avoid player 1. With this change, we make our game Bayesian, because we could think
that the two choices of player 2 (wishes to meet or wishes to avoid player 1) are his two possible
types(each one of them can be chosen with probability 1/2).
The following two matrices illustrate the Bayesian game in a more understandable way. We can
think player 1(row player), as the player who could only have one type and player 2(column player)
the player who has 2 possible types. These two types correspond to the two matrices. Therefore,
each matrix is chosen with probability 1/2, like the probability of each type of player 2. Thus,
after the nature reveals the type vector, its obvious that player 2 knows the exact game but player
1 must compute his beliefs to find the type of player 2.
Ballet Football
Ballet (2,1) (0,0)
Football (0,0) (1,2)
Table 2.4: Type 1 of player 2
Ballet Football
Ballet (2,0) (0,2)
Football (0,1) (1,0)
Table 2.5: Type 2 of player 2
By the definition of this game we can understand that the possible strategies are only the pure
ones, since each person could choose only one of his two choices. For example, it is not possible
for player 1 to play mixed strategy (1/2,1/2) because there is no way, half of player 1 be located
at Ballet and the other half at the football match.
In this game the strategy profile (B,(B,F)) is a Bayesian Equilibrium. This notation expresses
the strategy that chosen by each player. In particular, it means that player 1 choose action Ballet,
and player 2 choose Ballet, if he is in type 1 and choose Football if we is in type 2. This is Bayesian
Equilibrium because given the other player strategy each player’s response is the best. B is the
best response of player 1 given that the strategy of player 2 is (B,F). This is true because
u1(B, (B,F )) = 1/2× 2 + 1/2× 0 = 1
but if player 1 plays F then his payoff is equal to
u1(B, (B,F )) = 1/2× 0 + 1/2× 1 = 1/2
In addition, if player 1 plays B then (B,F) is the best response of player 2 because for type 1
(left table), 1 > 0 (1 and 0 are the two possible types of player 2 if player 1 choose Ballet) and for
type 2(see right table), 2 > 0.
With similar procedure we can check if a tuple of strategies is Bayesian Equilibrium for any
Bayesian game.
2http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/electrical-engineering-and-computer-science/6-254-game-theory-with-engineering-
applications-spring-2010/
Chapter 3
Robust Game Theory
In 2006 Aghassi and Bertsimas [1] presented a distribution-free model of incomplete information
games in which the players use a robust optimization approach to choose their strategies.This
model relaxes the distributional assumptions of Harsanyi’s Bayesian games, and it gives rise to an
alternative distribution-free equilibrium concept.
In this chapter we focus on this recently class of Games. We begin by giving the new notation,
that the two authors used in their paper and the one that we will use in the rest of this thesis.
Following that, we develop the basic theory of this new approach and make a small extension of
one specific class of this games. At the end of this chapter, several methods for finding the set
of Robust Optimization Equilibria are implemented. Our finding results are compared with the
original paper.
Aghassi and Bertsimas developed both robust games with private and without private information.
In this thesis we focus only in the case of games with no private information
3.1 New Notation
In section (2.2), we discussed about the robust optimization approach for solving problems with
parameters under uncertainty. More specifically we mentioned that in this approach one makes
optimal decisions based on his worst case scenario. After that, we developed the basic theory re-
lated to games in order to make the reader more familiar with concepts like Best Response,Pure
and Mixed Strategies and Equilibrium. In both of these sections of Chapter 2 we used the most
common notation of the literature.
In this section, we formulate again some of the basic notations and definitions that we will need
in the rest of this thesis. We also, redefine the notions of Best Response and Equilibrium for the
complete and incomplete games without private information.
Lets start from the N-player complete information games (Nash Games)in which player i has ai
possible actions. In these games, as we have mentioned in the Mathematical background Chapter
the payoff matrix Pˇ ∈ RN×
N∏
i=1
ai
is fixed, and as a result all players are able to know the exact
payoff functions of all other players.
In particular, Pˇ i(j1,j2,....jN ) denotes the payoff to player i when player k ∈ {1, 2, ....N} plays action
jk ∈ {1, 2, ...., ak} and
Sai = {xi ∈ Rai |xi ≥ 0,
ai∑
Ji=1
xiji = 1} (3.1)
expresses the set of all possible mixed strategies of player i over all actions {1, 2, ...ai}. Moreover,
let pii(P ;x
1, x2, ...xN ) indicate the expected payoff of player i when the payoff matrix is given by
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P and player k ∈ {1, 2, ....N} plays mixed strategy xk ∈ Sak . That is,
pii(P ;x
1, x2, ...xN ) =
a1∑
j1=1
...
ai∑
ji=1
...
aN∑
jN=1
P i(j1,j2,....jN )
N∏
i=1
xiji (3.2)
Finally, in this thesis, we use exactly like Bertsimas and Aghassi ([1]) the following shorthands:
x−i = (x1, x2, .., xi−1, xi+1, ...xN )
(x−i, ui) = (x1, x2, .., xi−1, ui, xi+1, ...xN )
S =
N∏
i=1
Sai
S−i =
N∏
k=1,k 6=i
Sak
Using the this new notation we develop again the following very important definitions:
Nash Games:
In the complete information Games with fixed payoff matrix Pˇ the best response of player i to
the other players’ strategies x−i ∈ S−i belongs to:
argmax
ui∈Sai
pii(Pˇ ;x
−i, ui) (3.3)
and following the same reasoning of definitions (2.4.3) and (2.4.4) we can derive that the tuple of
strategies (x1, x2, ...xN ) ∈ S is Nash Equilibrium if for each player i ∈ {1, 2....N}:
xi ∈ argmax
ui∈Sai
pii(Pˇ ;x
−i, ui) (3.4)
Bayesian Games:
In Bayesian Games the payoff matrix P˜ is subject to uncertainty. As we have already mentioned
we are interested for games with no private information. Therefore each player has only one
possible type and players i′s best response to the other players’ strategies x−i ∈ S−i belongs to:
argmax
ui∈Sai
[E
P˜
pii(P˜ ;x
−i, ui)] (3.5)
and similar with definition (2.4.8) the (x1, x2, ...xN ) ∈ S is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
if for each player i ∈ {1, 2....N}:
xi ∈ argmax
ui∈Sai
[E
P˜
pii(P˜ ;x
−i, ui)] (3.6)
Remark 3.1.1. Notice that by linearity of pii over set U and by linearity of expectation operator
E
P˜
the following is true:
E
P˜
pii(P˜ ;x
−i, ui) = pii(E
P˜
[P˜ ];x−i, ui) (3.7)
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where E
P˜
[P˜ ] is the element-wise expected value of P˜ .
This observation has as a result, that a Bayesian Game without private information is equivalent
to a Complete Information Game (Nash Game) with payoff matrix equal to E
P˜
[P˜ ]. (This can be
shown by combining the equations (3.5), (3.7) and (3.3)).
3.2 The Distribution-Free Model and the Basic Theory
3.2.1 The Robust Optimization Model
To classify a game, in a specific category of games it must have some certain characteristics. For
example one of the main characteristics of a Bayesian game is that the distribution over types is
common knowledge. Following that, we understand that the new class of robust games can be
described by specific features.
What we call Robust Game
We call robust the game with the following two features:
1. The players are not informed or choose to ignore any probability distribution over their
payoff functions.The only knowledge, which is common, is that all players being aware about
an uncertainty set, in which, all values of the uncertain parameters of payoff matrix belong.
2. All players choose to use a robust optimization approach (see previous chapter) to the un-
certainty and this is also common knowledge. Therefore, in this model of games, given the
other players’ strategies, each player try to maximise his worst case expected payoff.
Definition 3.2.1. (Robust optimization Equilibrium):
In an N-player robust game we called Robust optimization Equilibrium the tuple of strategies
(x1, x2, ....xN ) iff given the other players’ strategies x
−i each player i plays the strategy that
ensures him the maximum payoff under the worst case scenario.
From the above modelling and analogous to Harsanyi’s Bayesian Games(equations (3.5), (3.6)),
Aghassi and Berstimas defined the notions of best response and Robust Optimization Equilibrium
for finite robust games with no private information.
Players i’s best response to the other players’ strategies x−i is the strategy that belongs to:
argmax
ui∈Sai
[ inf
P˜∈U
pii(P˜ ;x
−i, ui)] (3.8)
and (x1, x2, ....xN ) is a Robust Optimization Equilibrium if and only if for each player
i ∈ {1, 2....N},
xi ∈ argmax
ui∈Sai
[ inf
P˜∈U
pii(P˜ ;x
−i, ui)] (3.9)
Important observations about the new model has to be emphasized:
Remark 3.2.1. Infimum represents the worst case scenario
One can think the infimum of formulas (3.8) and (3.9) with the following way. In Harsanyi model
the players know the distribution over their payoff functions and for this reason each of them tries
to maximize his expected payoff function (the average value of his profit) based on this distribution.
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Now, in case of robust games, players are not aware about any distribution. They only know that
the payoff matrix of the game belongs in an uncertainty set U. Therefore, each player tries to
maximize the payoff that he can receive under the worst case scenario, in the scenario that the
payoff matrix is the one that will give him the minimum (infimum) profit.
Remark 3.2.2. Benefit of no private Information assumption
In both, Bayesian and Robust games we assume that the players commonly know all possible tuples
of payoff parameters and all possible type vectors as well(in the occasion of private information).
In the case now, that robust game has no private information each player has one and only specific
type and that is a common knowledge. Consequently, we have only one type vector in each game
which mean that all players have the same information about the uncertainty payoff matrix P˜ .
Remark 3.2.3. In general not equivalent to a complete information game(Nash Game)
In robust games, unlike Bayesian games(see (3.7)), the worst case expected payoff is greater than
the expected worst case payoff(the element-wise worst case of the payoff matrix P˜ that denote with
the inf
P∈U
[P˜ ]) .
inf
P˜∈U
pii(P˜ ;x
−i, ui) ≥ pii( inf
P˜∈U
[P˜ ];x−i, ui) (3.10)
The two parts of (3.10) are equal only in a special case of robust games in witch the uncertainty
set U have a specific form.(see section (3.3))
Remark 3.2.4. Reasonable combination of Equilibrium and Worst case notions
One could argue that the concepts of equilibrium and worst case scenario are irrelevant. This is
not true. By claiming that each player use a worst case approach we mean that given the strategies
of all other players, he select a robust view only for the parameters that included in his payoff
function and he totally ignores any other parameter of the game.
The robust optimization approach of the players is common knowledge. That is, all players know
the best response of all other players in any combination of strategies. For this reason the players
can predict the outcome of the robust game and like the complete information games they know
which tuple of strategies is equilibrium.
3.2.2 Two concrete examples of finite robust games
To illustrate the robust games, Aghassi and Bertsimas use the robust form of three popular games:
The Inspection Game, The Free Rider Game and the Network Routing Game. In this thesis in all
experiments that we will make we focus on the Robust Free Rider Game and the Robust Inspection
Game. In this subsection we present these two games.
Robust Free Rider Game
The Free rider is a two player game in which each player has two possible actions, to contribute
or not contribute in the common good. If a player decides to contribute then he bears a cost of
amount c (fixed in the complete information game(cˇ) but uncertain under the robust approach(c˜)).
If one of the two player decide to contribute then both of them enjoy a payoff of 1. The players
choose strategies simultaneously. The representation of this game summarized in Table 3.1 where
c˜ belongs in a the uncertainty set [cˇ−∆, cˇ+ ∆].
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Table 3.1: Payoff matrix of Robust Free Rider Game
Contrib NoCon
Contrib (1− c˜, 1− c˜) (1− c˜, 1)
NoCon (1, 1− c˜) (0,0)
Player 2
P
la
y
e
r
1
Robust Inspection Game
The Robust inspection Game is a two player game in which the row player is the employee (pos-
sible actions:Shirk or Work) and the column player is the employer( possible actions: Inspect or
not Inspect). The two players choose their actions simultaneously and then they receive the cor-
responding to the combination of their strategies payoffs. When the employee works he has cost g˜
and his employer has profit equal to v˜. Each inspection costs to the employer h˜ but if he inspects
and find the employee shirking then he does not pay him his wage w. In all other cases employee’s
wage is paid. All values except the payment w of the employee are uncertain. In the general case:
(g˜, v˜, h˜) ∈ [g, g]× [v, v]× [h, h].
Table 3.2: Payoff Matrix for the Robust Inspection Game
Inspect NotInspect
Shirk (0,−h˜) (w, -w)
Work (w − g˜, v˜ − w − h˜) (w − g˜, v˜ − w)
3.2.3 Existence of robust optimization equilibria
In the previous chapter we discussed about the two very important theorems (2.4.1) and (2.4.2)
in which Nash and Harsanyi respectively proved the existence of Equilibrium in the complete(Nash
Games) and incomplete information games(Bayesian Games).
Following that, Aghassi and Bersimas [1] except that formalized the robust games they proved the
existence of equilibrium in finite games with bounded uncertainty sets.
To show this, they first proved that if the uncertainty set U of all possible payoff matrices P˜ is
bounded then:
1. The worst case expected payoff functions of all players is continuous on Ra1+a2+....aN
2. For any player i ∈ {1, 2, ...N} and for any fixed x−i ∈ S−1 the worst case expected payoff is
concave in xi
Using these two statements and Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem [28](like Nash did in [33]for
the complete information games) they proved the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2.1. (Existence of Equilibria in Robust Finite Games)
Any N-person, non cooperative, simultaneous-move, one shot finite robust game in which the
uncertainty set of the payoff matrices U ⊆ RN×
N∏
i=1
ai
is bounded and there is no private information,
has an equilibrium.
Proof. [1]
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3.2.4 Computing sample equilibria of Robust Finite Games
As we have already discussed in section (2.4) to examine if one specific tuple of strategies is equi-
librium is a trivial procedure in any kind of game. However, to find the set of all equilibria of a
game, with complete or incomplete information, is a very difficult task. To overcome this problem
many algorithms were developed by the researchers. In most of them the game was transformed, in
an equivalent problem like stationary point problems, unconstrained penalty function minimization
problem or a system of miltilinear equalities and inequalities.
For example for the particular group of two player, non fixed-sum, finite games the most commonly
accepted algorithm for finding the equilibria is the Lemke-Howson algorithm [29].
In [1], a theorem for approximately finding all equilibria of a robust finite game with
bounded polyhedral uncertainty set and no private information was developed. In partic-
ular the authors showed that the set of equilibria is a component-wise projection of the solution
set of a system of multi linear equalities and inequalities. By component-wise projection we simply
mean that if one solution of the multilinear system is (x1, x2, ....xN , zi, φi, θi) then the equilibrium
of the corresponding game it will be (x1, x2, ....xN ). We keep the coordinates of the solution that
express the mixed strategies of the players.
The main steps of the computational method are presented as follows:
1. Check if the uncertainty set of the payoff matrix is bounded polyhedral. With other words,find
F ∈ Rl×mn and d ∈ Rl×1 that satisfy the equation (2.22) for all possible vec(P˜ ).
2. Find the extreme points G`), ` ∈ {1, 2, ...k} of the uncertainty set U .
3. Estimate the multilinear system which corresponds to the robust finite game. (following the
theorem (3.2.2))
4. Calculate the corresponding to the multi-linear system penalty function h(y)(see (3.15).
5. Solve the unconstrained minimization problem min
y∈Rv
h(y)
The first two steps of this procedure are trivial for each given game. For example, the un-
certainty set of Free Rider Game(see subsection (3.2.2)) has only two extreme points( definition
(3.2.2)) which are the two vertices c = cˇ−∆ and c = cˇ+ ∆.
The most demanding part of the steps that we have to follow, in order to find the equilibria of
a robust game is the estimation of the system of equations and inequalities.
If we are aware that the uncertainty set U of the game is closed and bounded then we can derive
the following:
(x1, x2, ....xN )is equilibrium⇔ xi ∈ argmax
ui∈Sai
{ inf
P˜∈U
pii(P˜ ;x
−i, ui)} ∀i in {1, 2, ...N}
⇔ inf
P˜∈U
pii(P˜ ;x
−i, xi) > inf
P˜∈U
pii(P˜ ;x
−i, ui), ∀ui in Sai , ∀i in {1, 2, ...N}
⇔ inf
P˜∈U
pii(P˜ ;x
−i, xi) > max
ui∈Sai
inf
P˜∈U
pii(P˜ ;x
−i, ui) ∀i in {1, 2, ...N}
⇔ min
P˜∈U
pii(P˜ ;x
−i, xi) > max
ui∈Sai
min
P˜∈U
pii(P˜ ;x
−i, ui) ∀i in {1, 2, ...N}
(3.11)
The change from infimum to minimum in the last equivalence of the above expression is due to
the fact that U is close and bounded uncertainty set.
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From the above statements we understand that (x1, x2, ....xN ) is a robust optimization equi-
librium of the finite robust game iff ∀i = 1, 2...N :
min
P˜∈U
pii(P˜ ;x
−i, xi)− max
ui∈Sai
min
P˜∈U
pii(P˜ ;x
−i, ui) ≥ 0
with e′xi = 1 and xi ≥ 0.
In the case now that the uncertainty set U is bounded polyhedral the above system can be
converted to a multi-linear system with equalities and inequalities. (see theorem (3.2.2))
Definition 3.2.2. (extreme point) An extreme point of set S is a point that belongs to S, which
does not lie in any open line segment joining two points of S. Intuitively, in our case where our set
S is polyhedral the extreme points are its vertices.
Theorem 3.2.2. (Computation of Equilibria in Robust Finite Game(from [1])) Assume that we
have N-player robust finite game(N ≤ ∞ with each player has 1 ≤ ai ≤ ∞ posssible actions) with
no private information and in which the payoff uncertainty set U ⊆ RN
N∏
i=1
ai
is a bounded polyhe-
dral given by (2.22). Let G(`), ` ∈ {1, 2, ....k} denote the extreme points of U. Then the following
conditions are equivalent.
Condition 1:
(x1, x2, ....xN ) is an equilibrium of the robust game.
Condition 2:
For all players i ∈ {1, 2, ....N} there exists zi ∈ R,θi ∈ Rk, φi ∈ Rsuch that (x1, x2, ....xN , zi,θi, φi)
satisfies the following constraints:
zi = φi
zi − pi1(G(`);x1, x2, ....xN ) ≤ 0, ` = 1, 2, ..., k
e>xi = 1
xi ≥ 0
e>θi = 1
k∑
`=1
θi`(G(`);x
−i, eiji)− φi ≤ 0 ji = 1, ...ai
θi ≥ 0
(3.12)
Condition 3:
For all players i ∈ {1, 2, ....N} there exists ηi ∈ Rm, ξi ∈ R
N
N∏
i=1
ai
such that (x1, x2, ....xN ,ηi, ξ
i)
satisfies the following constraints:
ξi
>Y i(x−i)eiji ≤ d>ηi ji = 1, 2, ..., ai
F>ηi− Y i(x−i)xi = 0,
e′xi = 1
xi ≥ 0
ηi ≥ 0
Fξi ≥ d
(3.13)
where Y i(x−i) ∈ R(N
∏N
i=1 ai)×ai denotes the matrix such that
vec(P )>Y i(x−i)xi = pii(P ;x−i, xi) (3.14)
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Remark 3.2.5. All computations of this chapter are made based on system of Condition 2. The
reason, is that the size (number of variable and constraints) of the multi-linear system of Condition
3 is much larger (see Table 1 in [1]).
However, in chapter 4, when we develop our new distributionally robust approach(see theorem
(4.2.1)), the method for compute all equilibria is similar to the system of Condition 3(with no
extreme points)
Up to this point, we have discussed that to approximately find the set of all equilibria of a
robust game we must convert the problem to a system of equations and inequalities. The only
part that still remains unspecified is how we can compute all feasible solutions of this multi-linear
system.
An answer to this was also given by Bertsimas and Aghassi who used the following Penalty Func-
tion:
h(y) = 1/2
∑
n∈E [gn(y)]
2 + 1/2
∑
n∈I [max(gn(y), 0)]
2 (3.15)
where y ∈ Rv, gn(y) = 0 if n ∈ E and gn(y) ≤ 0 if n ∈ I. y denotes the vector of
all uncertain variables of the multi-linear system and each gn(y) one constraint (equality if n ∈ E
and inequality if n ∈ I).
Finally, by solving the unconstrained minimization problem min
y∈Rv
h(y) we collect the desired
feasible solutions.
In the numerical results of [1] authors used what they called pseudo-Newton method with
Armijo rule to solve the unconstrained optimization.
In this thesis we develop different methods (section (3.4)) for the estimation of the feasible solutions
of the multi-linear system and we compare our results with the original paper (see table (3.4)).
3.3 Extension of the Special Class of robust games
As previously mentioned in remark (3.2.3), in the general case of robust finite game the following
is true:
inf
P˜∈U
pii(P˜ ;x
−i, ui) ≥ pii( inf
P˜∈U
[P˜ ];x−i, ui) (3.16)
However, there is one special class of games that the inequality in the previous equation become
equality. Using this property for this class of games we reduce the necessary computations to the
minimum, since instead of estimate the set of equilibria of our initial robust game we can simply
compute the equilibria of the complete information game with fixed payoff matrix inf
P∈U
[P ].
Theorem 3.3.1. (Special Class of Robust Games , from [1]) :
Consider the robust game with the uncertainty set:
U = {P (f1, f2, ....fv)|(f1, f2, ....fv) ∈ Uf}} (3.17)
where
Uf = {(f1, f2, ....fv)|f` ∈ [f`, f`], ` ∈ {1, 2, ....v}}. (3.18)
Suppose that ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ...N} and ∀` ∈ {1, 2, ....v} ∃k(i, `) such that:
sign(
∂
∂f`
[P i(j1,....,jn)(f1, f2, ....fv)](f1,f2,....fv)=(f˜1,f˜2,....f˜v)) = k(i, `) (3.19)
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Then (x1, x2, ...xN ) is robust optimization equilibrium of this game if it is Nash equilibrium of the
complete information game with same number of players and same number of actions ai for each
player i. The payoff matrix for the complete information game is:
Qi(j1,...jN ) = P
i
(j1,...jN )
(hi1, ....h
i
v) (3.20)
where
hi` =
{
f` if k(i, `) < 0
f` if k(i, `) ≥ 0
Remark 3.3.1. Therefore, using this theorem, instead of solving the robust game like we developed
in the previous section we can solve the complete information game with payoff matrix Qi(j1,...jN ).
Q is the matrix that can be obtained if we choose the right values for each parameter f` ∈ [f`, f`]
in order to achieve the minimum payoff for each player ∀(j1, j2, ..., jn) ∈
N∏
i=1
{1, 2..., ai}.
The extension
Aghassi and Bertsimas in their theorem (theorem (3.3.1)) assumed that the uncertainty set must
be equal to U = {P (f1, f2, ....fv)|(f1, f2, ....fv) ∈ Uf} where Uf is like (3.18). In our extension each
parameter f` its not necessary to belongs in a closed continuous set [f`, f`].
The only necessary assumption is that the set where each parameter f` belongs must have maximum((maxf`))
and minimum ((minf`)) values.
That is, if f` ∈ K` then (maxf`), (minf`) ∈ K` and this means that ∀x ∈ K` the following must
be true:
(minf`) ≤ x ≤ (maxf`)
.
In our formulation, set K`, will be always like this, ∀` ∈ {1, 2, ....v}.
Theorem 3.3.2. (Extension of special class): The formulation is exactly the same as the original
theorem except that the uncertainty set is:
U = {P (f1, f2, ....fv)|(f1f2, ....fv) ∈ Uf}} (3.21)
where
Uf = {(f1, f2, ....fv)|f` ∈ K`, ` ∈ {1, 2, ....v}} (3.22)
Thus, the parameters in the payoff matrix Qi(j1,...jN ) = P
i
(j1,...jN )
(hi1, ....h
i
v) take values:
hi` =
{
(maxf`) if k(i, `) < 0
(minf`) if k(i, `) ≥ 0
Proof. If we show that the
min
P˜∈U
pii(P˜ ;x
−1, ui) = pii(Q;x−1, ui) (3.23)
then
xi ∈ argmax
ui∈Sai
{min
P˜∈U
pii(P˜ ;x
−i, ui)} = argmax
ui∈Sai
pii(Q;x
−1, ui) (3.24)
and by definitions of the Robust Optimization equilibrium (3.9) and Nash Equilibrium (3.4) we
obtain the desired result. Proving this we show that (x1, x2, ...., xn) is equilibrium of the robust
game if and only if is a Nash Equilibrium in complete information game with Q as a fixed payoff
matrix.
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Q is payoff matrix so it belongs to the uncertainty set U . This implies that:
pii(Q;x
−1, ui) ≥ min
P˜∈U
pii(P˜ ;x
−i, ui) ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..N} ∀{x−i, ui} ∈ S. (3.25)
Conversely, by the definition of matrix Q and the values of the parameters (hi1, ....h
i
v) the follow
is true ∀i ∈ {1, 2..., N} and ∀{j1, j2, ..jN} ∈
∏N
i=1{1, 2, ...ai}:
Qi(j1,...jN ) ≤ P i(j1,...jN )(f i1, ....f iv), ∀(f1, f2, ...fv) ∈ Uf
Hence for every tuple of mixed strategies and for every player:
min
P˜∈U
pii(P˜ ;x
−i, ui) = min
f˜∈Uf
pii(P (f˜1, f˜2, ..f˜v);x
−i, ui)
By the definition of expected payoff in complete information game and from the fact that
min
f˜∈Uf
P i(j1,...jN )(f˜1, f˜2, ..f˜v) = P
i
(j1,...jN )
(h1, ....hv)
we obtain the following:
pii(Q;x
−1, ui) ≤ min
P˜∈U
pii(P˜ ;x
−i, ui) ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..N} ∀{x−i, ui} ∈ S. (3.26)
Importance of the extension:
Consider the Robust Inspection Game of subsection (3.2.2). In the general case of this game the
uncertainty set is: (g˜, v˜, h˜) ∈ [g, g]× [v, v]× [h, h] which is like the desired form of equation (3.18).
For example if g˜ ∈ [8, 12], v˜ ∈ [16, 24], h˜ ∈ [4, 6]andw = 15 then following the theorem (3.3.1) the
initial robust inspection game is equivalent with the complete information game with payoff matrix:
Table 3.3: Payoff Matrix for the Robust Inspection Game
Inspect NotInspect
Shirk (0 ,-6) (15, -15)
Work (3,-5) (3,1)
Now with our extension(theorem (3.3.2)), instead solving the initial robust game we can solve
the complete information game of table (3.3) for more possible values of the uncertain parameters.
The only limitation is that the set K` of each parameter f` must have maximum and minimum
values.
For example the equilibria of a robust game with uncertainty parameters g˜ ∈ {8, 8.5, 9, 12}, v˜ ∈
[16, 18]∪ {23, 24}, h˜ ∈ {4, 6} and w = 15 are exactly the same with the complete information game
of table (3.3).
3.4 Experimentation and Implementation of algorithms
As previously discussed in subsection (3.2.4), to approximately compute the equilibria of a ro-
bust game, Aghassi and Bertsimas first estimate a multi-linear system (see theorem (3.2.2) ) and
then to find the feasible solutions of this system they minimise the penalty function (3.15), using
Pseudo-Newton Method with Armijo rule.
In this section we provide three other methods for approximately computing sample robust
optimization equilibria. In particular, using these methods we solve the two games that Berstimas
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and Aghassi first presented in [1] and that we have already described in subsection (3.2.2). Then
we make a comparison of our results with the original paper.
The specific robust games that we deal with are:
• The Robust Free Rider Game with uncertainty set c˜ ∈ [c, c] = [1/4, 5/8]
• The Robust Inspection Game with (g˜, v˜, h˜) ∈ [g, g] × [v, v] × [h, h] = [8, 12] × [16, 24] × [4, 6]
and w = 15.
For the implementation of the methods we used Matlab R2014b and all numerical evaluations
of this section were conducted on a 2.27GHz, Intel Core i5 CPU 430 machine with 4GB of RAM.
The new methods
The methods that we use for solving the aforementioned games are the following:
• BFGS algorithm with Armijo rule: Like Bertsimas and Aghassi estimate the multi-linear
system and then minimise the penalty function (3.15) using BFGS algorithm with Armijo
rule.
• Steepest Descent method with Armijo rule: Again estimate the multi-linear system but now
for the minimization of the penalty function (3.15) we use Steepest Descent with Armijo
rule.
• Modelling method using the Matlab toolbox of YALMIP.[30]
In all methods, for the computation of the desired multi-linear system we used Theorem (3.2.2)
and we formulated the set of equilibria using System (3.12).
BFGS and Steepest Descent algorithms
In all runs of these two algorithms we initialized the strategy xi of each player i ∈ {1, 2...N} in a
way that satisfy the non negativity and normalization constraints. The vector θi, that corresponds
to the number of the extreme points, was initialized in the same way. Furthermore, we initialized
the variable zi of each player to be the maximum value of the upper-bound of the constraint on
zi and the variable φi to be either equal to zi or equal to the minimum value imposed by the
lower-bound constraint on φi.
To be able to compare the pseudo-Newton Method with the Steepest Descent and the BFGS
algorithms that we create, the penalty method (3.15) of the original paper was employed. For the
implementation of these algorithms we used the Optimization Toolbox of Matlab. More specifically
we used the fminunc function which is able to provide the minimum of unconstrained multi-variable
function.
[y, fval, exitflag, output] = fminunc(h(y),Y0) (3.27)
As inputs fminunc accepts the h(y) which is the penalty function (3.15) that we want to min-
imise and Y0 which represents the starting point of the algorithm. In the outputs, y is the desired
minimum point of h(y), fval is the value of the objective function h(y) at the solution y, exitflag is
a value that describes the exit condition and output is a structure that contains information about
the optimization.
By using this function is not necessary to calculate the gradient or the Hessian matrix of the penalty
method h(y) that we have to minimize.
In particular, when we use fminunc, two line search strategies are used, depending on whether
gradient information is readily available or whether it must be calculated using a finite differ-
ence method. When gradient information is available, the default is to use a cubic polynomial
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method. When gradient information is not available which is our case , the default is to use a
mixed quadratic and cubic polynomial method.
The termination criteria for each run of these two methods are the same with [1].
• Robust Free Rider Game: We terminated each run of the algorithms either when the objective
function fallen below 10−10 or if the number of iterations exceeded 2000.
• Robust Inspection Game: We terminated the each run of the algorithms if the objective
function fallen bellow 10−8.
Modelling method using YALMIP
The YALMIP model that we generated is directly computed from the multi-linear system. There-
fore, is not necessary to use any penalty function like the other two algorithms. This is great
advantage since there is no need for extra calculations. The output of this algorithm is a 3-
dimensional matrix whose each 2-dimensional face represents the strategies of the two players that
form an equilibria. Each of these 2-dimensional face has the following form:
(
x11 x
2
1
x12 x
2
2
)
Results and Comparison of the Methods
Note that all methods produce exactly the same equilibria with the original paper. That is, for
the robust free rider game with c˜ ∈ [1/4, 5/8] we obtain three equilibria (x11, x21): (1,0),(0,1) and
(3/8,3/8) and for the robust inspection game with g˜ ∈ [8, 12], v˜ ∈ [16, 24], h˜ ∈ [4, 6] and w = 15
only one unique equilibrium (x11, x
2
1)=(0.4,0.8).
Nevertheless, our goal is not to find the equilibria of these games but to compare which one of
these methods compile faster.
The differences of the four methods that we studied are summarized on Table 3.4. The main
compared features of the algorithms are the time that each algorithm takes to compile and the
number of average iterations. The first row of each game corresponds to the Pseudo-Newton
method and the results that Berstimas and Aghassi found when they run their method. The rest
three rows show the results of our experimentation for the three other methods with which we
choose to solve the two games.
To estimate the compilation time for the BFGS and Steepest Descent algorithms we use the
“tic-toc” command of Matlab and for the YALMIP method we use the “sol.solvertime” command,
where sol is the solution of our model.
For the Robust Inspection game in [1], authors run their numerical method only one time since
they know that this game has unique equilibrium (0.4,0.8). In our results we run all methods for
both games 15 times. This is the reason for the difference between sum and average time in the
robust inspection game.
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Table 3.4: Comparison of the 4 algorithms which approximately compute sample robust optimiza-
tion equilibria (time is presented in seconds)
Algorithms min-time max-time sumtime average-time average-iterations
Robust Free Rider Game
Pseudo-Newton - - 110.748 7.3827 1652.1
BFGS 0.0565 0.1063 1.2740 0.0849 52.9333
Steepest-Descent 0.0495 0.1177 1.3080 0.0872 44.9333
YALMIP 0.2091 0.2657 3.4716 0.2314 -
Robust Inspection Game
Pseudo-Newton - - - 0.5 71
BFGS 0.1179 0.1823 1.9331 0.1289 74.0667
Steepest-Descent 0.1186 0.1564 2.1241 0.1416 70.6
YALMIP 0.2688 1.8690 9.0447 0.6030 -
Observations and Remarks:
• As we expect the BFGS algorithm is faster than the Steepest Descent (see section (2.1)). In
fact the fastest method in both problems is the BFGS and the slowest is the modelling with
YALMIP.
Even though YALMIP is the slowest method, we choose to use it because there is no need for
extra pre-calculations that are prone to human error. (YALMIP model is directly formulated
from the multi-linear system so the using of penalty function is unnecessary).
• Note, that the average computational time of all methods that we present is preferred compare
to the original Pseudo-Newton Method of [1].
We consider that this difference is attributable to the use of different computers.
Chapter 4
The New Model - Distributionally
Robust Game Theory
In this chapter we present for the first time in the literature a new model of incomplete information
games without private information in which the players use a distributionally robust optimization
approach to cope with payoff uncertainty.
In the first part of this chapter we propose the new model of games and show that under specific
assumptions about the ambiguity set and the values of risk levels, Distributionally Robust Game
constitutes a true generalization of the three finite games that we developed in previous chapters
(Nash games, Bayesian Games and Robust Games).
In the next section, we prove that the set of equilibria of an arbitrary distributionally robust
game with ambiguity set like the one of equation (4.1) and without private information can be
computed as the component-wise projection of the solution set of a multi-linear system of equations
and inequalities.
Subsequently, for special cases of such games we show equivalence to complete information finite
games (Nash Games) with the same number of players and same action spaces. Thus, when our
game falls within these special cases one can simply solve the corresponding Nash Game.
Finally to concretize the idea of a distributionallly robust game we present two examples, the
Distributionally Robust Free Rider Game and the Distributionally Robust Inspection Game.
F = {Q : Q[W · vec(P˜ ) ≤ h] = 1, EQ[vecP˜ ] = m, EQ[
∥∥∥vec(P˜ )−m∥∥∥
1
] ≤ s} (4.1)
We require that any probability distribution that belongs in this ambiguity set must satisfy
three properties:
1. All payoff matrices P˜ of the probability distributions must belong to an uncertainty bounded
polyhedral set U = [P : W · vec(P ) ≤ h].
2. All distributions of P˜ that belong in this ambiguity set must necessarily have fixed expected
value and equal to vector m.
3. We require that any payoff matrix of any distribution Q must be close to its expected value.
The maximum possible distance is denoted with variable s. The 1-norm is preferable since it
leads to linear constraints which are easier to handle numerically.
4.1 Formulation of the New Model
In previous chapters we discussed about three very important classifications of Games. First in
Chapter 2 we developed the Static Games of Complete Information(Nash Games) and the Static
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Games of Incomplete Information(Bayesian Games). Then in the Chapter 3 we focused on the
recently proposed class of distribution-free model of incomplete-information games (Robust Games).
The theory for every aforementioned game was developed based on two very important concepts
of Game Theory area: the Best Response and the Equilibrium.
Following this, we find appropriate to introduce the new model of Distributionally Robust Games
by giving these two definitions and explain them later in details.
Definition 4.1.1. (Best Response in Distributionally Robust Games)
In the distributionally robust model, for the case without private information, players i’s best re-
sponse to the other players strategies x−i ∈ S−i must belong to:
argmin
ui∈Sai
sup
Q∈F
Q-CVaRεi [−pii(P˜ ;x−i, ui)] (4.2)
Definition 4.1.2. (Distributionally Robust Optimization Equilibrium)
(x1, x2, ...xN ) ∈ S is said to be a Distributionally Robust Optimization Equilibrium of the corre-
sponding game with incomplete information iff ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..N},
xi ∈ argmin
ui∈Sai
sup
Q∈F
Q-CVaRεi [−pii(P˜ ;x−i, ui)] (4.3)
As we developed in Section (2.2) Distributionally Robust Optimization is closely related to
both stochastic programming and robust optimization. Based on this, our new model of games can
be considered a concept closely related to Harsanyi’s Bayesian Games and Robust Games that we
previously discussed.
In more detail, in Bayesian Games we assume that all players of the game know the exact dis-
tribution of the payoff matrix. Now, in the Distributionally Robust approach the players do not
know the exact distribution. Instead, they only be aware of a common known ambiguity set F of
all possible probability distributions Q that satisfy some specific properties. These distributions
have no restriction in their form. That is, the ambiguity set may consists by both, discrete and
continuous distributions of the payoff matrix.
In addition, similar to the robust games framework, we assume that each player adopts a worst case
approach to the uncertainty. Only now the worst case is computed over all probability distributions
within the set F . For this formulation that is similar with distributionally robust optimization con-
cept we named these games Distributionally Robust Games and we refer to their equilibrium
as Distributionally Robust Optimization Equilibrium.
Explanation of the CVaR in the formula
As we have mentioned in subsection (2.3.2) Conditional Value at Risk(CVaR) is one of the most
popular quantile-based risk measures because of its desirable computational properties.
Exactly for these properties we chose to introduce CVaR in the formulas of best response and
distributionally robust optimization equilibrium of the new model.
Using Q-CVaRεi , we allowed the players to have several risk attitudes which is a major difference
compared to all other games that we thoroughly analysed in this thesis and in which the players
are always risk neutral. Important hypothesis is that risk attitude is a fixed characteristic of each
player and it can not be changed depending the game. It is not a notion like the mixed strategy that
a player can choose in order to achieve his best response and minimise his loss. More specifically,
the parameter εi ∈ (0, 1) determines the risk-aversion of each decision-maker. In detail, if player i
Distributionally Robust Game Theory 43
has risk level εi = 1 this means that he is risk neutral since the Conditional Value at Risk is equal
to the expected value of his loss function (Q-CVaRεi = EQ). On the other hand if εi ≤ 1 the player
is risk averse and as εi −→ 0 the risk aversion of the player become larger.
Conclusively, as parameter εi decreases the value of Q-CVaRεi increases and the risk aversion of
the player becomes larger and vice versa.
With the introduction of a risk measure in our model we take into account not only that player wish
to maximize his gain (minimize loss) but and how much is willing to risk to achieve this maximum
value(minimum value).
1st assumption:
The first assumption that we have to make for the new model is that the risk attitude of each player
is assumed to be common knowledge. That is, each player knows how much risk averse are the
other players and that all other players know that he knows.
In general, CVaR can be calculated from either the probability distribution of gains or the
probability distribution of losses. In this thesis we decide to follow the original formulation of
Rockafellar and Uryasev (see [37] and [36]) and calculate it from the distribution of losses.
For this reason, in definitions of best responce (definition (4.1.1)) and distributionally robust opti-
mization equilibrium (definition (4.1.2)) we use the expected loss function of player i, −pii(P ;x−i, xi).
Loss distributions are also responsible for the using of argmin
ui∈Sai
supQ∈F instead of argmax
ui∈Sai
infQ∈F
that we use in robust games.
Remark 4.1.1. In distrinutionally robust game the ‘performance’ of player’s mixed strategy is
measured by his expected loss. Given the other player’s strategies each player seeks to minimize
his worst case CVaR. The worst case CvaR is taken with respect to the ambiguity set, and the
expected loss is taken over the mixed strategies of the players.
Finally, in the formulation of the distributionally robust game we have to make another two
assumptions.
2nd assumption:
The players commonly know the ambiguity set of all possible distributions (discrete and continuous)
of the payoff matrix.
3rd assumption:
Each player adopts, like the Robust games, a worst case approach to the uncertainty, only now the
worst case is computed over all probability distributions within the set F . In particular we assume
that all players use a worst case CVaR approach.
4.1.1 A generalization of all other finite Games
From the formulation of the distributionally robust games (definitions of best response and equi-
librium) we can easily understand that only two are the parameters that are amenable to change.
These are, risk level εi of each player i and the ambiguity set F . In particular, we assume that
parameter εi which shows the risk level of each player can take any value in the interval (0, 1) and
we make no assumptions for the ambiguity set. That is, depending on the game that one faces he
can choose the more suitable properties that the distributions of the ambiguity set must satisfy.
Hence, if we assume some extra constraints for parameter εi and set F , the previous general
formulation can become very specific.
Let’s assume that all players i ∈ {1, 2, ...N} have the same risk level, εi = 1. Then from the
definition of CVaR we obtain the following ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ...., N}:
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Q-CVaRεi [−pii(P˜ ;x−i, ui)] = Q-CVaR1[−pii(P˜ ;x−i, ui)]
= EQ[−pii(P˜ ;x−i, ui)]
(4.4)
Therefore the definition of best response (4.1.1) become:
argmin
ui∈Sai
sup
Q∈F
Q-CVaRεi [−pii(P˜ ;x−i, ui)] = argmin
ui∈Sai
sup
Q∈F
EQ[−pii(P˜ ;x−i, ui)]
= argmin
ui∈Sai
sup
Q∈F
[−pii(EQ[P˜ ];x−i, ui)]
= argmax
ui∈Sai
inf
Q∈F
[pii(EQ[P˜ ];x−i, ui)]
(4.5)
The equality in the second line in the above expression follows from the linearity of expectation
operator and the linearity of pii. See remark (3.1.1) that EQ[pii(P˜ ;x−i, ui)] = [pii(EQ[P˜ ];x−i, ui)]
where EQ[P˜ ]is the component-wise expected value of P˜ . The equality in the third line is due to
the following properties of the linear functions:
max f(x) = −min[−f(x)]
and
z ∈ argmin
x∈Sai
f(x) = z ∈ argmax
x∈Sai
− f(x).
Now, using the assumption that εi = 1 ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ...N} and by choosing the right properties
for the probability distributions of the payoff matrix we can specify our formulation and create the
desire games.
Theorem 4.1.1. (Distributionally Robust Games = Generalization of all other games)
In the distributionally robust games players i’s best response to the other players strategies x−i ∈
S−i must belong to:
argmin
ui∈Sai
sup
Q∈F
Q-CVaRεi [−pii(P˜ ;x−i, ui)] (4.6)
If we assume that εi = 1 ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ...N}
Then:
1. If F = {Q : EQ[P˜ ] = Ψ} the set of equilibria of the distributionally robust game is equivalent
to that of a classical Nash Game.
2. If the ambiguity set is singleton, that is, F = {Q}, the distributionally robust game game
have the same equilibria with a related finite Bayesian Game.
3. If F = {Q : Q[W · vec(EQ[P˜ ]) ≤ h] = 1 the set of the distributionally robust optimization
equilibria is equivalent to that of the classical Robust game model of Chapter 3.
Proof. In (4.5) we have shown that when εi = 1 ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ...N} the next equality is true:
argmin
ui∈Sai
sup
Q∈F
Q-CVaRεi [−pii(P˜ ;x−i, ui)] = argmax
ui∈Sai
inf
Q∈F
[pii(EQ[P˜ ];x−i, ui)] (4.7)
Using this property we obtain the following results:
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For Nash Games:
If F = {Q : EQ[P˜ ] = Ψ}
argmax
ui∈Sai
inf
Q∈F
[pii(EQ[P˜ ];x−i, ui)] = argmax
ui∈Sai
inf
Q∈F
[pii(Ψ;x
−i, ui)]
= argmax
ui∈Sai
[pii(Ψ;x
−i, ui)]
(4.8)
which is equivalent to the formulation of best response in the Nash Games (see equation (3.3)).
Bayesian Games:
If the ambiguity set is singleton. That is that F = {Q}.
argmax
ui∈Sai
inf
Q∈F
EQ[pii(P˜ ;x−i, ui)] = argmax
ui∈Sai
EQ[pii(P˜ ;x−i, ui)] (4.9)
which is equivalent to the formulation of best response in the Bayesian Games (see equation
(3.5)).
For Robust Game:
If F = {Q : Q[EQ[P˜ ] ∈ U ] = 1} where U = {P : W · vec(P ) ≤ h}
Therefore
argmax
ui∈Sai
inf
Q∈F
[pii(EQ[P˜ ];x−i, ui)] = argmax
ui∈Sai
inf
S˜∈U
[pii(S˜;x
−i, ui)] (4.10)
where S˜ = EQ[P˜ ];
which is equivalent to the formulation of best response in the Robust Games (see equation (3.9)).
Conclusions:
We named Distributionally Robust Game the incomplete information game in which:
• The players commonly know the ambiguity set F of all possible distributions Q of the payoff
matrix P˜ .
• Each player adopts, like the Robust games, a worst case approach to the uncertainty, only now
the worst case is computed over all probability distributions within the set F . In particular
we assume that all players use a worst case CVaR approach.
• The risk attitude of each player is assumed to be common knowledge. That is, each player
knows the risk levels of all other players and that all other players know that he knows.
4.2 Computing sample equilibria of Distributionally Robust Games
In section (3.2.4), we presented the general method that Bertsimas and Aghassi [1] used for com-
puting sample robust optimization equilibria of a robust finite game. We also discussed about the
difficulty of finding all equilibria of a game and how nowadays the researchers developed various
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approaches for the solution of this challenge. For example, one of the most widely used numer-
ical technique to overcome this problem is the utilization of a multi linear system.(see [24] and [42]).
In this section, we present theorem (4.2.1), in which we show that for any finite distributionally
robust games with ambiguity set like the one defined in (4.1), and with no private information the
set of equilibria is a projection of the solution set of multilinear system of equalities and inequalities.
The projection is like in [1], the component wise one into a lower dimension space.
Theorem 4.2.1. (Computation of Equilibria in Distributionally Robust Finite Games)
Consider the N-player distributionally robust game in which i ∈ {1, 2, ....N} has action set {1, 2, ....ai}, 1 <
ai <∞, in which the ambiguity set is:
F = {Q : Q[P˜ ∈ U ] = 1, EQ[vecP˜ ] = m, EQ[
∥∥∥vec(P˜ )−m∥∥∥
1
] ≤ s} (4.11)
where U = {P : W · vec(P ) ≤ h} is bounded and polyhedral set,
and in which there is no private information. The following two conditions are equivalent.
Condition 1) (x1, x2, ....xN ) is an equilibrium of the distributionally robust game.
Condition 2) For all i ∈ {1, 2, ....N} there exists αi, ζi, ρi ∈ R, γi ∈ R+, βi, λi, κi, δi, νi, τ i, f i, φi, gi ∈
RN
∏N
i=1 a1 , ξi, θi ∈ Rm such that(x1, x2, ....xN , αi, ζi, ρi, γi,βi, λi, κi, δi, νi, τ i, f i, φi, gi, ξi, θi)
satisfies:
ζi +
1
εi
αi +
1
εi
m>βi + 1εi sγ = ρi, e
>xi = 1,
αi −m>λi +m>κi + h>ξi ≥ 0, −λi + κi +W>ξi − βi = 0,
λi + κi − γie ≤ 0, δi + νi − γie ≤ 0
αi −m>δi +m>νi + h>θi + ζi ≥ 0
−δi + νi +W>θi − βi − Y i(x−i)xi = 0
−e>gi − e>φi ≤ 1εi s, −τ i− f i = 1εim
−τ i + φi ≤ σim, τ i + φi ≤ −σim
Wτ i ≥ −σih, Wf i ≥ −h
−f i + gi ≤m, f i + gi ≤ −m
ρie
> ≤ f>Y i(x−i)
λi, κi, δi, νi, xi ≥ 0, θi, ξi, φi, gi ≤ 0
γ ≥ 0,
(4.12)
where Y i(x−i) ∈ R(N
∏N
i=1 ai)×ai denotes the matrix such that
vec(P )>Y i(x−i)xi = pii(P ;x−i, xi) (4.13)
σi is a fixed number ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ....N}
σi =
1− εi
εi
(4.14)
and parameter εi denotes the risk level of player i.
Proof: By the Formulation of the Distributionally robust games Condition 1 is equivalent to
xi ∈ argmin
ui∈Sai
sup
Q∈F
Q-CVaRεi [−pii(P˜ ;x−i, ui)] ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ...., N} (4.15)
From Rockafellar and Uryasev [36] and [37] we know that :
Q-CVaRεi [−pii(P˜ ;x−i, ui)] = min
ζi∈R
ζi +
1
εi
EQ[−pii(P˜ ;x−i, ui)− ζi]+ (4.16)
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where [x]+ = max{x, 0}.
Therefore equation (4.15) is equivalent to:
xi ∈ argmin
ui∈Sai
sup
Q∈F
min
ζi∈R
ζi +
1
εi
EQ[−pii(P˜ ;x−i, ui)− ζi]+ ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ...., N} (4.17)
From Saddlepoint theorem ( Sion’s minimax theorem [40] ) we could exchange the order of
supremum and infimum(minimum) resulting:
xi ∈ argmin
ui∈Sai
min
ζi∈R
ζi +
1
εi
sup
Q∈F
EQ[−pii(P˜ ;x−i, ui)− ζi]+ ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ...., N} (4.18)
From the moment problem theory, supQ∈F EQ[−pii(P˜ ;x−i, ui) − ζi]+ can be cast as the fol-
lowing problem:
maximize
∫
U
[−pii(P ;x−i, ui)− ζi]+dµ(vec(P ))
subject to µ ∈M+RN
∏N
i=1 a1∫
U
dµ(vec(P )) = 1∫
U
vec(P )dµ(vec(P )) = m∫
U
‖vec(P )−m‖1 dµ(vec(P )) ≤ s,
(4.19)
where M+RN
∏N
i=1 ai is the set of non-negative measures supported on RN
∏N
i=1 ai .
There is a duality theory for moment problems(see [44] and [34]) which implies that the following
dual problem attains the same optimal value:
minimize αi +m
>βi + sγi
subject to αi ∈ R, βi ∈ RN
∏N
i=1 ai , γi ∈ R+
αi + vec(P˜ )
>βi +
∥∥∥vec(P˜ )−m∥∥∥
1
γi ≥ [−pii(P˜ ;x−i, ui)− ζi]+ ∀P ∈ U .
(4.20)
By replacing the definition of [·]+:
minimize αi +m
>βi + sγi
subject to αi ∈ R, βi ∈ RN
∏N
i=1 a1 , γi ∈ R+
αi + vec(P˜ )
>βi +
∥∥∥vec(P˜ )−m∥∥∥
1
γi ≥ −pii(P˜ ;x−i, ui)− ζi ∀P ∈ U
αi + vec(P˜ )
>βi +
∥∥∥vec(P˜ )−m∥∥∥
1
γi ≥ 0 ∀P ∈ U .
(4.21)
Substituting this dual formulation of supQ∈F EQ[−pii(P˜ ;x−i, ui)− ζi]+ into (4.18), we obtain
the following which we call Main Problem. The projection of the solution set of this problem will
be the set of the equilibria that we desire.
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min
ui,ζi,αi,βi,γi
ζi +
1
εi
(αi +m
>βi + sγi)
subject to αi ∈ R, βi ∈ RN
∏N
i=1 a1 , γi ∈ R+, ζi ∈ R
ui ∈ Sai
αi + vec(P˜ )
>βi +
∥∥∥vec(P˜ )−m∥∥∥
1
γi ≥ −pii(P˜ ;x−i, ui)− ζi ∀P ∈ U
αi + vec(P˜ )
>βi +
∥∥∥vec(P˜ )−m∥∥∥
1
γi ≥ 0 ∀P ∈ U .
(4.22)
This is now a ‘classical robust optimisation problem’ and we use standard duality techniques
to simplify the semi-infinite constraints.
We know that:
f(p) ≥ k, ∀p ∈ U ⇔ min
p∈U
f(p) ≥ k
Therefore, using this the two robust constraints of the linear program (4.22) become:
min
P∈U
[αi + vec(P )
>βi + ‖vec(P )−m‖1 γi + pii(P ;x−i, ui)] ≥ −ζi (4.23)
and
min
P∈U
[αi + vec(P )
>βi + ‖vec(P )−m‖1 γi] ≥ 0 (4.24)
The left hand sides of the constraints (4.23) and (4.24) are equivalent to the following problems
(4.25) and (4.26) respectively.
min
vec(P )
αi + vec(P )
>βi + ‖vec(P )−m‖1 γi + pii(P ;x−i, ui)
subject to W · vec(P ) ≤ h.
(4.25)
and
min
vec(P )
αi + vec(P )
>βi + ‖vec(P )−m‖1 γi
subject to W · vec(P ) ≤ h.
(4.26)
In turn these programs are equivalent to:
min
vec(P ),η
αi + vec(P )
>βi + γi
N
∏N
i=1 a1∑
j=1
ηj + vec(P )
>Y i(x−i)ui
subject to W · vec(P ) ≤ h
ηj ≥ vec(P )j −mj ∀j = 1, 2, ...N
N∏
i=1
ai
ηj ≥mj − vec(P )j ∀j = 1, 2, ...N
N∏
i=1
ai.
(4.27)
and
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min
vec(P ),η
αi + vec(P )
>βi + γi
N
∏N
i=1 ai∑
j=1
ηj
subject to W · vec(P ) ≤ h
ηj ≥ vec(P )j −mj ∀j = 1, 2, ...N
N∏
i=1
ai
ηj ≥mj − vec(P )j ∀j = 1, 2, ...N
N∏
i=1
ai.
(4.28)
where ηj = |vec(P )j −mj |, ∀j = 1, 2, ...N
∏N
i=1 ai and Y
i(x−i) is as defined in (4.13).
The dual problems of (4.27) and (4.28) are respectively the following:
max
δi,βi,θi
αi −m>δi +m>νi + h>θi
−δi + νi +W>θi − βi − Y i(x−i)ui = 0
δi + νi − γie ≤ 0
δi ≥ 0, νi ≥ 0, θi ≤ 0.
(4.29)
max
λi,κi,ξi
αi −m>λi +m>κi + h>ξi
−λi + κi +W>ξi − βi = 0
λi + κi − γie ≤ 0
λi ≥ 0, κi ≥ 0, ξi ≤ 0.
(4.30)
We know that:
∃p ∈ U : f(p) ≥ K ⇔ max
p∈U
f(p) ≥ K
Subsequently, we substitute the last two problems (4.29) and (4.30) in the Main Problem
(4.22).
Therefore for each player i ∈ {1, 2, ...N}, ∃ αi, γi, ζi ∈ R,βi, λi, κi, δi, νi ∈ RN
∏N
i=1 ai and
ξi, θi ∈ Rm such that (xi, βi, λi, κi, δi, νiξi, θi,αi, γi, ζi) is a minimizer of:
min
ui,αi,βi,γi,ζi,λi,κi,ξi,δi,νi,θi
ζi +
1
εi
αi +
1
εi
m>βi +
1
εi
sγi
e>ui = 1
αi −m>λi +m>κi + h>ξi ≥ 0
−λi + κi +W>ξi − βi = 0
λi + κi − γie ≤ 0
αi −m>δi +m>νi + h>θi + ζi ≥ 0
−δi + νi +W>θi − βi − Y i(x−i)ui = 0
δi + νi − γie ≤ 0
λi ≥ 0, κi ≥ 0, ξi ≤ 0
δi ≥ 0, νi ≥ 0, θi ≤ 0
ui ≥ 0, γi ≥ 0.
(4.31)
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whose dual is:
max
τ i,ρi,f i,φi,gi,
ρi
−e>gi − e>φi ≤ 1
εi
s
−τ i− f i = 1
εi
m
−τ i + φi ≤ σim
τ i + φi ≤ −σim
Wτ i ≥ −σih
−f i + gi ≤m
f i + gi ≤ −m
Wf i ≥ −h
ρie
> ≤ f>Y i(x−i)
φi ≤ 0, gi ≤ 0.
(4.32)
σi is a fixed number ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ....N}
σi =
1− εi
εi
(4.33)
and parameter εi denotes the risk level of player i.
Condition 2 follows from strong linear programming duality.
The reverse direction (Condition 2 =⇒ Condition 1) is also holds as all steps of our proof are based
on the equivalence of the two parts.
4.3 Analysing the ambiguity set
In all distributionally robust games that we develop in this thesis the ambiguity set have the
following form:
F = {Q : Q[W · vec(P˜ ) ≤ h] = 1, EQ[vecP˜ ] = m, EQ[
∥∥∥vec(P˜ )−m∥∥∥
1
] ≤ s} (4.34)
This, combined with different risk levels εi for player i ∈ {1, 2, ..N} allows several variations of
each distributionally robust game. By changing the values of ambiguity set’s uncertain parameters
W,h,m and s and assuming each time different risk attitudes for the players the set of distri-
butionally robust optimization equilibria which constitute the solution of our problem can change
dramatically.
At this point, we present the role of each uncertain parameter of the ambiguity set (4.34). The
properties of this set were also mentioned in the beginning of this chapter.
Matrix W ∈ R(m×N
∏N
i=1 ai) and vector h ∈ Rm are the two variables which represent the uncer-
tainty polyhedral set in which the uncertain values of the payoff matrix should belong.
The maximum distance of all possible vec(P˜ ) from the average vector m is denoted by scalar s.
Finally, m ∈ RN
∏N
i=1 ai is the vector that denotes the expected value of vec(P˜ ) for each distribution
that belongs in the ambiguity set.
Important assumption: Vector m must belong to the bounded uncertainty polyhedral set of the
payoff matrix P˜ . Otherwise the ambiguity set F will be empty.
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Special Cases of Distributionally Robust Games
Under certain conditions (special cases), the set of equilibria of distributionally robust finite game
with ambiguity set like (4.34) is equivalent to that of a related finite game with complete payoff
information (Nash Game) and with the same number of players and the same action spaces. Thus,
when our game falls within these special cases one can simply solve the corresponding Nash Game.
The special cases of such games are studied in the next three lemmas.
Lemma 4.3.1. The set of equilibria of a distributionally robust game in which all players are risk
neutral (εi = 1, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..N}) is equivalent to the set of equilibria of a Nash Game with fixed
payoff matrix Ψ where vec(Ψ) = m. (m is the average vector of the ambiguity set (4.34). )
Proof. As we have already mentioned at (4.5) when εi = 1:
argmin
ui∈Sai
sup
Q∈F
Q-CVaRεi [−pii(P˜ ;x−i, ui)] = argmax
ui∈Sai
inf
Q∈F
[pii(EQ[P˜ ];x−i, ui)] (4.35)
The second constraint of the ambiguity set F is EQ[vecP˜ ] = m. Therefore if we denote with Ψ
the matrix for which vec(Ψ) = m then we get that Ψ = EQ[P˜ ] and that:
argmax
ui∈Sai
inf
Q∈F
[pii(EQ[P˜ ];x−i, ui)] = argmax
ui∈Sai
inf
Q∈F
[pii(Ψ;x
−i, ui)]
= argmax
ui∈Sai
[pii(Ψ;x
−i, ui)]
(4.36)
which is equivalent to the formulation of best response in the Nash Games (see equation (3.3)).
Lemma 4.3.2. The set of equilibria of a distributionally robust game in which the parameter s of
the ambiguity set (4.34) is equal to zero(s=0) is equivalent to the set of equilibria of a Nash Game
with fixed payoff matrix M where vec(M) = m. (m is the average vector of the ambiguity set
(4.34). )
Proof. The third constraint of the ambiguity set is:
EQ[
∥∥∥vec(P˜ )−m∥∥∥
1
] ≤ s
For s = 0(s −→ 0) become
EQ[
∥∥∥vec(P˜ )−m∥∥∥
1
] ≤ 0 (4.37)
Then because all the values inside the expectation operator EQ are positive we have that
EQ[
∥∥∥vec(P˜ )−m∥∥∥
1
] = 0 (4.38)
and that
Q[
∥∥∥vec(P˜ )−m∥∥∥
1
= 0] = 1 (4.39)
which is equivalent to
Q[vec(P˜i)−mi = 0] = 1, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ...RN
∏N
i=1 a1}. (4.40)
Therefore if s −→ 0 the third constraint of the ambiguity set is equivalent to:
Q[vec(P˜ )−m = 0] = 1 (4.41)
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which means that vec(P˜ ) = m for all distributions of the ambiguity set.
so:
F = {Q : Q[W · vec(P˜ ) ≤ h] = 1, EQ[vecP˜ ] = m, Q[vec(P˜ ) = m] = 1}
= {Q : Q[vec(P˜ ) = m] = 1}
(4.42)
Using the definition of best response we can find now the equivalence between our game and a
Nash Game.
argmin
ui∈Sai
sup
Q∈F
Q-CVaRεi [−pii(P˜ ;x−i, ui)] = argmin
ui∈Sai
Q-CVaRεi [−pii(M ;x−i, ui)]
= argmin
ui∈Sai
[−pii(M ;x−i, ui)]
= argmax
ui∈Sai
[pii(M ;x
−i, ui)]
(4.43)
where vec(M) = m.
Lemma 4.3.3. The set of equilibria of a distributionally robust game that had a support single
point is equivalent to the set of equilibria of a Nash Game with fixed payoff matrix the one that
corresponds to this single point. Single point is named the unique payoff matrix which created
from specific values of the matrix W and vector h of the ambiguity set. The values of matrix W
and vector h are selected in order to make the uncertainty set U = {P : W ·vec(P ) ≤ h} singleton.
Proof. The uncertainty set U is a singleton. Therefore the first constraint of the ambiguity set
Q[W · vec(P˜ ) ≤ h] = 1 (4.44)
is equivalent to:
Q[P˜ = C] = 1 (4.45)
where C denotes the support single point, the only matrix of set U .
Thus the ambiguity set becomes:
F = {Q : Q[P˜ = C] = 1, EQ[vecP˜ ] = m, Q[vec(P˜ ) = m] = 1} (4.46)
where vec(C) = m.
Using this, the desired result follows:
argmin
ui∈Sai
sup
Q∈F
Q-CVaRεi [−pii(P˜ ;x−i, ui)] = argmin
ui∈Sai
Q-CVaRεi [−pii(C;x−i, ui)]
= argmin
ui∈Sai
[−pii(C;x−i, ui)]
= argmax
ui∈Sai
[pii(C;x
−i, ui)]
(4.47)
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The main reason of using the ambiguity set (4.1) in the developing of our theorem is because
is restrictive enough to imply tractable optimization problems and at the same time is expressive
enough to cover a large variety of different ambiguity sets. By choosing carefully the values of
W,h,m and s of the ambiguity set, together with the possibility of several risk levels εi we are
able to solve many variations of one specific distributionally robust game.
The practical applicability of these three special cases of distributionally robust games is showed
in the next chapter.
4.4 Two concrete examples of finite Ditsributionally Robust Games
Having presented our distributionally robust games model we will now illustrate our approach with
two concrete examples.
4.4.1 Distributionally Robust Free Rider Game
In subsection (3.2.2), we have explained the robust approach of the classical two player Free Rider
Game that Bertsimas and Aghassi first proposed in 2006. In particular, in [1] authors showed that
the robust free rider game with c˜ ∈ (1/4, 5/8) has exactly three equilibria (1, 0), (0, 1), (3/8, 3/8).
To develop similar results with them, but for the Distributionally Robust approach that we intro-
duced we change the formulation of the problem and we create the Distributionally Robust Free
rider Game.
Problem Description:
The Distributionally Robust Free rider is a two player game in which each player has
two possible actions, to contribute or not contribute in the common good. If a player decide to
contribute then he bears a cost of amount c˜ and both players enjoy a payoff of 1. If none of the
players contributes then no one loses or gains money. The players choose strategies simultaneously.
The representation of this game is similar with Table 3.1 of section (3.2.4).
Table 4.1: Distributionally Robust Free Rider Game
Contrib NoCon
Contrib (1− c˜, 1− c˜) (1− c˜, 1)
NoCon (1, 1− c˜) (0,0)
Player 2
P
la
y
e
r
1
In the classical Free rider game the parameter c˜ is fixed (c˜ = cˇ) and in the robust approach
c˜ ∈ [cˇ−∆, cˇ+ ∆] where ∆ is fixed strictly positive number.
In our new, distributionally robust approach, players have partial information about the proba-
bility distribution of the uncertain variable c˜ (about the probability distribution Q of the payoff
matrix P˜ ). In particular, the players do not know the exact distribution of the payoff matrix. They
only be aware of a common known ambiguity set F of all possible probability distributions Q that
satisfy some specific properties. Subsequently, all players adopt a worst case CVaR approach to the
uncertainty which is computed over all probability distributions within the set F . The introduction
of the CVaR in the formulation of the game allows the two players to have different risk attitudes.
Finally, the risk levels of the players are assumed to be common knowledge and none of the two
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players has private information.
For example, we may consider the distributionally robust free rider game in which the ambiguity
set is given by:
F1 = {Q : Q[c˜ ∈ [cˇ−∆, cˇ+ ∆]] = 1, EQ[vec(P˜(c))] = m, EQ[
∥∥∥vec(P˜(c))−m∥∥∥
1
] ≤ s} (4.48)
Where: ∆ > 0, s ≥ 0, cˇ is the mid point of the interval of c˜ and
P˜(c) =
(
(1− c˜, 1− c˜) (1− c˜, 1)
(1, 1− c˜) (0, 0)
)
(4.49)
Important assumption: Vector m of the second constraint of the ambiguity set F must belong
to the bounded uncertainty polyhedral set of the payoff matrix P˜ . Otherwise the ambiguity set F
will be empty. For the distributionally Robust free rider game this corresponds to: m ∈ [cˇ−∆, cˇ+∆]
4.4.2 Distributionally Robust Inspection Game
Problem Description:
As we have seen in subsection (3.3) at Table 4.2 the Robust Inspection Game its a two player
game in which the row player is the employee (possible actions:Shirk or Work) and the column
player is the employer(with possible actions Inspect or not Inspect).
Table 4.2: Distributionally Robust Inspection Game
Inspect NotInspect
Shirk (0,−h˜) (w, -w)
Work (w − g˜, v˜ − w − h˜) (w − g˜, v˜ − w)
The two players choose their actions simultaneously and then they receive the corresponding
to the combination of their strategies payoffs. When the employee works he has cost g˜ and his
employer has profit equal to v˜. Each inspection costs to the employer h˜ but if he inspects and find
the employee shirking then he does not pay him his wage w. In all other cases employee’s wage is
paid. All values except the payment w of the employee are uncertain.
In distributionally robust inspection game, players have partial information about the proba-
bility distributions of the uncertain variables g˜, v˜ and h˜ (about the probability distribution Q of
the payoff matrix P˜ ). In particular, the players do not know the exact distribution of the pay-
off matrix. They only be aware of a common known ambiguity set F of all possible probability
distributions Q that satisfy some specific properties. Subsequently, all players adopt a worst case
CVaR approach to the uncertainty which is computed over all probability distributions within the
set F . The introduction of the CVaR in the formulation of the game allows the two players to have
different risk attitudes. Finally, the risk levels of the players are assumed to be common knowledge
and none of the two players has private information.
In particular,the following ambiguity set F may denote the set of all probability distributions
that are consistent with the known distributional properties of Q.
F2 = {Q : Q[(g˜, v˜, h˜) ∈ [g, g]×[v, v]×[h, h]] = 1, EQ[vec(P˜(g,v,h))] = m, EQ[
∥∥∥vec(P˜(g,v,h))−m∥∥∥
1
] ≤ s}
(4.50)
Distributionally Robust Game Theory 55
Where: s ≥ 0, and
P˜(g,v,h) =
(
(0,−h˜) (w,−w)
(w − g˜, v˜ − w − h˜)) (w − g˜, v˜ − w)
)
(4.51)
Vector m of the second constraint of the ambiguity set must belong to the bounded polyhedral
uncertainty set of payoff matrix P˜ . For the Distributionally Robust Inspection Game that is,
m ∈ [g, g]× [v, v]× [h, h]. Otherwise the ambiguity set will be empty.
Chapter 5
Numerical Evaluation
In this chapter, we experimentally evaluate the new model of games described in Chapter 4 and
investigate its practical applicability. Our main goal is to show how the number of equilibria and
players’ payoffs change under several assumptions about the ambiguity set and the players’ risk
levels. The games with witch we deal in this chapter are the previously developed concrete exam-
ples of Distributionally Robust Free Rider Game and Distributionally Robust Inspection Game.
The method that we use to approximately compute the distributionally robust optimization
equilibria and the players’ payoffs at each equilibrium of any distributionally robust game is devel-
oped as follows:
1. Check if the ambiguity set of the distributionally robust game can be expressed like the
general form of equation (4.1). ( The ambiguity sets of Distributionally Robust Free Rider
Game and Distributionally Robust Inspection Game have this property.)
2. Estimate the multi-linear system of equalities and inequalities whose dimension-reducing
component-wise projection of the feasible solution set is equivalent with the set of equilibria
of the distributionally robust game (see theorem (4.2.1))
3. Find the feasible solutions of the multi-linear system and for each solution keep the compo-
nents that correspond to the strategies of the players (projection of the solution). Addition-
ally, compute the players’ payoffs at each equilibrium. These are achieved using the YALMIP
modelling language [30], in Matlab 2014b.1
All numerical evaluations of this chapter were conducted on a 2.27GHz, Intel Core i5 CPU 430
machine with 4GB of RAM.
More specifically, in this chapter using tables and figures we present the results (equilibria and
players’ payoffs at equilibria) after the implementation of our YALMIP code. The procedure that
we must follow before run the code in order to transform the ambiguity set of each game in the
general form (4.1) is available in Appendix.
5.1 Special Cases
In this section we evaluate the number of equilibria and players’ payoffs for the special cases of the
two aforementioned games. Special cases are like in section (4.3) the following distinct versions of
the distributionally robust games:
• All players of the game are risk neutral. That is, their risk levels are equal to one.(ε1 = ε2 = 1)
1After the conversion of the game to the multi-linear system of equations and inequalities choosing modelling in
YALMIP is the most preferable method as there is no need for extra pre-calculations that are prone to human error.
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• The maximum distance s of the third constraint of the ambiguity set is equal to zero(s = 0).
• Existence of support single point in the ambiguity set.
As we mentioned before we can create several versions of any distributionally robust game by
changing the uncertain variables of the ambiguity set and the players’ risk levels.
More specifically in the experiments of this section we assume the following:
• For the distributionally robust free rider problem the uncertainty set has mid point cˇ = 7/16
and ∆ = 3/16.
• For the distributionally robust inspection game the uncertain parameters can take the fol-
lowing values: g˜ ∈ [8, 12], v˜ ∈ [16, 24], h˜ ∈ [4, 6] and w = 15.
In both games we assume that the initial value of the average vector is m = m1 where m1
denotes the vector that corresponds to the nominal version of the game. Moreover, for every special
case of each distributionally robust game we make the same experiments using m = m2 as average
vector. The values m1 and m2 for each game are available in Appendix.
Note that average vector m of the ambiguity set F must belong to the bounded uncertainty poly-
hedral set of the payoff matrix P˜ . Otherwise the ambiguity set F will be empty.
Let us now focus on each special case of the two distributionally robust games separately.
5.1.1 Special Cases of Distributionally Robust Free Rider Game
In this subsection we present the results of the three aforementioned special cases for the distri-
butionally robust free rider game. The equilibria of each special case and players’ payoffs at each
equilibrium, are illustrated in Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3.
All tables have the same form. The first(second,third,...) payoff of player i corresponds to the
first(second,third,...) equilibria of the equilibria column of the table.
Table 5.1: Distributionally Robust Free Rider Game: Results when players are risk neutral. That
is, their risk levels are equal to one (ε1 = ε2 = 1). The values of maximum distance s and average
vector m of the ambiguity set are varied
(s) (m) Equilibria Payoff Player 1 Payoff Player 2
0 m1 (0,1), (1,0), (9/16,9/16) 1, 0.5625, 0.5625 0.5625, 1, 0.5625
2 m1 (0,1), (1,0), (9/16,9/16) 1, 0.5625, 0.5625 0.5625, 1, 0.5625
5 m1 (0,1), (1,0), (9/16,9/16) 1, 0.5625, 0.5625 0.5625, 1, 0.5625
10 m1 (0,1), (1,0), (9/16,9/16) 1, 0.5625, 0.5625 0.5625, 1, 0.5625
0 m2 (0,1), (1,0), (1/2,1/2) 1, 0.5, 0.5 0.5, 1, 0.5
2 m2 (0,1), (1,0), (1/2,1/2) 1, 0.5, 0.5 0.5, 1, 0.5
5 m2 (0,1), (1,0), (1/2,1/2) 1, 0.5, 0.5 0.5, 1, 0.5
10 m2 (0,1), (1,0), (1/2,1/2) 1, 0.5, 0.5 0.5, 1, 0.5
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Table 5.2: Dstributionally Fobust Free Rider Game: Results when the maximum distance of the
third constraint of the ambiguity set is equal to zero (s = 0). The players are allowed to have any
risk attitude(any value for εi) and the value of the average vector m must belong in the uncertainty
set.
Risk Levels (m) Equilibria Payoff Player 1 Payoff Player 2
ε1 = ε2 = 1/2 m1 (0,1), (1,0), (9/16,9/16) 1, 0.5625, 0.5625 0.5625, 1, 0.5625
ε1 = ε2 = 1/100 m1 (0,1), (1,0), (9/16,9/16) 1, 0.5625, 0.5625 0.5625, 1, 0.5625
ε1 = ε2 = 10/100 m1 (0,1), (1,0), (9/16,9/16) 1, 0.5625, 0.5625 0.5625, 1, 0.5625
ε1 = 13/100, ε2 = 54/100 m1 (0,1), (1,0), (9/16,9/16) 1, 0.5625, 0.5625 0.5625, 1, 0.5625
ε1 = ε2 = 1/2 m2 (0,1), (1,0), (1/2,1/2) 1, 0.5, 0.5 0.5, 1, 0.5
ε1 = ε2 = 1/100 m2 (0,1), (1,0), (1/2,1/2) 1, 0.5, 0.5 0.5, 1, 0.5
ε1 = ε2 = 10/100 m2 (0,1), (1,0), (1/2,1/2) 1, 0.5, 0.5 0.5, 1, 0.5
ε1 = 13/100, ε2 = 54/100 m2 (0,1), (1,0), (1/2,1/2) 1, 0.5, 0.5 0.5, 1, 0.5
Table 5.3: Distributionally Robust Free Rider Game: Results for any εi and any value of maximum
distance s, but with support single point(c=1/2)
Risk Levels (s) (m) Equilibria Payoff Player 1 Payoff Player 2
ε1 = ε2 = 1/2 3 m2 (0,1), (1,0), (1/2,1/2) 1, 0.5, 0.5 0.5, 1, 0.5
ε1 = ε2 = 1/100 47 m2 (0,1), (1,0), (1/2,1/2) 1, 0.5, 0.5 0.5, 1, 0.5
ε1 = ε2 = 10/100 1 m2 (0,1), (1,0), (1/2,1/2) 1, 0.5, 0.5 0.5, 1, 0.5
ε1 = 13/100, ε2 = 54/100 23.4 m2 (0,1), (1,0), (1/2,1/2) 1, 0.5, 0.5 0.5, 1, 0.5
Discussion of the Results:
As we expect, when the distributionally robust finite game is included in one of the three spe-
cial cases(see section (4.3)) then this is equivalent with a complete information game with fixed
payoff matrix the one that corresponds to the average vector m of the ambiguity set. For example
when m = m1 the distributionally robust free rider game for the special cases has 3 equilibria
(x11, x
2
1) : (1, 0), (0, 1) and (9/16, 9/16). These equilibria are exactly the same with the equilibria of
the Nash Game with fixed payoff matrix:
Pˇ =
(
(9/16, 9/16) (9/16, 1)
(1, 9/16) (0, 0)
)
, where vec(Pˇ ) = m1 (5.1)
Note that the payoffs of the two players at equilibria are also equivalent with the payoffs of the
corresponding Nash Game.
5.1.2 Special Cases of Distributionally Robust Inspection Game
In this subsection we present the results of the three aforementioned special cases for the distri-
butionally robust inspection game. The equilibria of each special case and players’ payoffs at each
equilibrium, are illustrated in Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6.
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Table 5.4: Distributionally Robust Inspection Game : Results when players are risk neutral. That
is, their risk levels are equal to one (ε1 = ε2 = 1). The values of maximum distance s and average
vector m of the ambiguity set are varied
(s) (m) Equilibria Payoff Player 1 Payoff Player 2
0 m1 (1/3,2/3) 5 -1.666
2 m1 (1/3,2/3) 5 -1.666
5 m1 (1/3,2/3) 5 -1.666
10 m1 (1/3,2/3) 5 -1.666
0 m2 (1/3,3/5) 6 -3.666
2 m2 (1/3,3/5) 6 -3.666
5 m2 (1/3,3/5) 6 -3.666
10 m2 (1/3,3/5) 6 -3.666
Table 5.5: Distributionally Robust Inspection Game: Results when the maximum distance of the
third constraint of the ambiguity set is equal to zero (s = 0). The players are allowed to have any
risk attitude(any value for εi) and the value of the average vector m must belong in the uncertainty
set.
Risk Levels (m) Equilibria Payoff Player 1 Payoff Player 2
ε1 = ε2 = 1/2 m1 (1/3,2/3) 5 -1.666
ε1 = ε2 = 1/100 m1 (1/3,2/3) 5 -1.666
ε1 = ε2 = 10/100 m1 (1/3,2/3) 5 -1.666
ε1 = 13/100, ε2 = 54/100 0 m1 (1/3,2/3) 5 -1.666
ε1 = ε2 = 1/2 m2 (1/3,3/5) 6 -3.666
ε1 = ε2 = 1/100 m2 (1/3,3/5) 6 -3.666
ε1 = ε2 = 10/100 m2 (1/3,3/5) 6 -3.666
ε1 = 13/100, ε2 = 54/100 m2 (1/3,3/5) 6 -3.666
Table 5.6: Distributionally Robust Inspection Game: Results for any εi and any value of s, but
with support single point (h=5,g=9,v=17,w=15)
Risk Levels (s) (m) Equilibria Payoff Player 1 Payoff Player 2
ε1 = ε2 = 1/2 3 m2 (1/3,3/5) 6 -3.666
ε1 = ε2 = 1/100 47 m2 (1/3,3/5) 6 -3.666
ε1 = ε2 = 10/100 1 m2 (1/3,3/5) 6 -3.666
ε1 = 13/100, ε2 = 54/100 23.4 m2 (1/3,3/5) 6 -3.666
Discussion of the Results:
We notice that in all tables the set of equilibria that we obtain are always equivalent with the
set of equilibria of the Nash Game with fixed payoff matrix the one that corresponds to the average
vector m of the ambiguity set. For example when m = m2 the distributionally inspection game
has only one unique equilibrium (1/3,3/5). This equilibrium is exactly the same with the Nash
Game with payoff matrix Pˇ where vec(Pˇ ) = m2 :
Pˇ =
(
(0,−h) (w,−w)
(w − g, v − w − h) (w − g, v − w)
)
=
(
(0,−5) (15,−15)
(15− 9, 17− 15− 5) (15− 9, 17− 15)
)
(5.2)
The payoffs of the two players at the equilibrium are also equivalent with the payoffs of the
corresponding Nash Game.
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5.2 Fixed ambiguity set - Several Risk Levels
In this section we perform the following experiment for both, Distributionally Robust Inspection
Game and Distributionally Robust Free Rider Game.
The Experiment:
What would happen to the number of equilibria and to the payments of the two players when the
ambiguity set is kept fixed while the values of players’ risk levels are varied.
5.2.1 For Distributionally Robust Inspection Game
As we have mentioned in section (4.4) the ambiguity set of the Distributionally Inspection Game
is the following:
F2 = {Q : Q[(g˜, v˜, h˜) ∈ [g, g]×[v, v]×[h, h]] = 1, EQ[vec(P˜(g,v,h))] = m, EQ[
∥∥∥vec(P˜(g,v,h))−m∥∥∥
1
] ≤ s}
(5.3)
Where: s ≥ 0, and
P˜(g,v,h) =
(
(0,−h˜) (w,−w)
(w − g˜, v˜ − w − h˜)) (w − g˜, v˜ − w)
)
(5.4)
In the special cases of this game, (see previous experiments) we have showed that this game
has unique equilibrium. More specifically, when the average vector of the ambiguity set is the
nominal(m = m1) we showed that this equilibrium is equal to (1/3,2/3)(see subsection (5.1.2)).
In this experiment we assume that the average vector m is the one that corresponds to the nominal
version of the game and without loss of generality that the maximum distance s of the third con-
straint of the ambiguity set is s = 4. In addition, we assume that g˜ ∈ [8, 12], v˜ ∈ [16, 24], h˜ ∈ [4, 6]
and w = 15. Therefore, since all variables of the ambiguity set are kept fixed 2, we can say that
the ambiguity set is kept fixed in this experiment . The only variables that are allowed to change
are the risk levels ε1 and ε2 of the two players.
The following tables and figures illustrate the number of equilibria and the players’ payoffs at
these equilibria for the aforementioned fixed ambiguity set while the players’ risk levels change.
More specifically Table 5.7 shows the equilibria of the previously described game when player
1 is risk neutral (ε1 = 1) and player 2 has several risk attitudes. The players’ payoffs at equilibria
for each combination of the risk levels are given in Figure 5.1.
Table 5.7: Distributionally Robust Inspection Game: The equilibria for different values of Risk
levels when the vector m of the ambiguity set take the nominal value and the maximum distance
is s = 4. Player 1 is risk neutral. His risk level is kept fixed (ε1 = 1) while player 2 has several
levels of risk aversion.
Risk Levels Equilibria
ε1 = 1, ε2 = 1 (1/3,2/3)
ε1 = 1, ε2 = 0.75 (0.333, 0.66)
ε1 = 1, ε2 = 0.5 (0.333, 0.66)
ε1 = 1, ε2 = 0.25 (0.333,0.66)(0.8179,0)
(0.9342,0.7069)
ε1 = 1, ε2 = 0.01 (1,0),(0,0.66),
(1,0.66),(1,0.1941)
(0.333,0.66),
(0.9654,0.1387),(1,0.59)
2The matrix W and vector h of the first constraint of the ambiguity set are also fixed because the uncertain
parameters of the payoff matrix (g˜, v˜, h˜) belong in a specific fixed uncertainty set
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 5.1: Graph representation of the payoffs of the two players at equilibria for different risk
levels. Risk level of player 1 is kept fixed (ε1 = 1) while player 2 has several levels of risk aversion.
The title in each sub-figure denotes the risk levels of the two players: (Players 1’s risk level, Players
2’s risk level).
Subsequently, Table 5.8 shows the equilibria of the previously described game when player 2 is
risk neutral (ε2 = 1) and player 1 has several risk attitudes. The players’ payoffs at equilibria for
each combination of the risk levels are given in Figure 5.2.
Table 5.8: Distributionally Robust Inspection Game: The equilibria for different values of Risk
levels when the vector m of the ambiguity set take the nominal value and the maximum distance
is s = 4. Player 2 is risk neutral. His risk level kept fixed (ε2 = 1) while player 1 has several levels
of risk aversion.
Risk Levels Equilibria
ε1 = 1, ε2 = 1 (1/3,2/3)
ε1 = 0.75, ε2 = 1 (0.333,0.666),(0.35,0.665),
(0.2583,0.96)
ε1 = 0.5, ε2 = 1 (0.333,0.666),(0.5379,0),
(0.3842,0.66)
ε1 = 0.25, ε2 = 1 (0.4427,0),(0.333,0.666),
(0,0.3467)
ε1 = 0.01, ε2 = 1 (0,0),(1,1),
(0.333,0.666),(0.33,0),
(0.335,1)
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 5.2: Graph representation of the payoffs of the two players at equilibria for different risk
levels. Risk level of player 2 is kept fixed (ε2 = 1) while player 1 has several levels of risk aversion.
The title in each sub-figure denotes the risk levels of the two players: (Players 1’s risk level, Players
2’s risk level)
Discussion of the Results:
In standard optimization problems we know that as the decision maker becomes more risk
averse his payoff always decreases. From the previous Figures 5.1 and 5.2 we can conclude that
in game theory situation this is not always the case. We can not have a general rule, since now the
nature of the problem is more complicated.
In all games that we develop in this thesis we assume that players are rational, so they can predict
the outcome of the game and choose the strategies that form an equilibrium. For this reason, a
difference at risk attitude of a player does not change only his decision but also the decisions of his
opponents.3. Hence, with increasing of risk aversion of one player the players’ payoffs at equilibria
may both increase or decrease depending the game. For example, in Figure 5.1 at Subfigure (d)
where the risk levels are (1,0.01) we can observe that for some equilibria the players have large
payments and for some others very low.
To verify that in the Distributionally Robust Inspection Game we can not have a general rule
about what happen in the payoffs of the two players when they choose to play strategies that
form equilibria we also present Table 5.9 and Figure 5.3 witch illustrate the payoffs of the two
players at equilibria when both of them are risk averse. More specifically when their risk levels are
ε1 = ε2 = 0.05 and ε1 = ε2 = 0.01
3in the distributionally robust games, risk attitude is assumed to be common knowledge
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Table 5.9: Distributionally Robust Inspection Game: Equilibria when the players’ risk levels are
ε1 = ε2 = 0.05 and ε1 = ε2 = 0.01
Risk Levels Equilibria
ε1 = ε2 = 0.05 (1,0.66),(1,1)(0.95,0),
(0.43,1),(0.333,0.666)
ε1 = ε2 = 0.01 (1,0),(0,0),(0.332,0),
(0.5303,1),(1,0.78)
(a) (b)
Figure 5.3: Graph representation of the players’ payoffs at equilibria when their risk levels are
ε1 = ε2 = 0.05 and ε1 = ε2 = 0.01.The title in each sub-figure denotes the risk levels of the two
players: (Players 1’s risk level,Players 2’s risk level)
5.2.2 For Distributionally Robust Free Rider Game
The ambiguity set of the distributionally robust free rider game that we use in this experiment has
the following form:
F1 = {Q : Q[c˜ ∈ [1/4, 5/8]] = 1, EQ[vec(P˜(c))] = m1, EQ[
∥∥∥vec(P˜(c))−m∥∥∥
1
] ≤ 2} (5.5)
Where:
P˜(c) =
(
(1− c˜, 1− c˜) (1− c˜, 1)
(1, 1− c˜) (0, 0)
)
(5.6)
In this experiment we assume that the uncertain parameter c˜ belongs to [1/4, 5/8], that the
average vector m is the one that corresponds to the nominal version of the game and without loss
of generality that the maximum distance s of the third constraint of the ambiguity set is always
s = 2. Therefore we can say that the ambiguity set is kept fixed. The only variables that are
allowed to change are the risk levels ε1 and ε2 of the two players
In previous experiments (see Section (5.1)) we showed that in special cases this distributionally
robust game has three equilibria. More specifically, when the average vector of the ambiguity set
is the nominal(m = m1) we showed that these equilibria are (0,1),(1,0) and (9/16,9/16).
Table 5.10 and Figure 5.4 illustrate the number of equilibria and the players’ payoffs at these
equilibria for the aforementioned fixed ambiguity set while the players’ risk levels change.
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Table 5.10: Distributionally Robust Free Rider Game: Results for different values of Risk levels
when the vector m of the ambiguity set take the nominal value and the maximum distance is s = 2.
Risk Levels Equilibria Payoff Player 1 Payoff Player 2
ε1 = 1, ε2 = 1 (0,1),(1,0),(9/16,9/16) 1, 0.5625, 0.5625 0.5625, 1, 0.5625
ε1 = 1, ε2 = 0.75 (0,1),(1,0),(9/16,9/16) 1, 0.5625, 0.5625 0.5625, 1, 0.5625
ε1 = 1, ε2 = 0.5 (0,1),(1,0),(9/16,9/16) 1, 0.5625, 0.5625 0.5625, 1, 0.5625
ε1 = 1, ε2 = 0.25 (0,1),(1,0),(9/16,9/16) 1, 0.5625, 0.5625 0.5625, 1, 0.5625
ε1 = 1, ε2 = 0.01 (0,1),(1,0),(9/16,9/16) 1, 0.5625, 0.5625 0.5625, 1, 0.5625
ε1 = 0.75, ε2 = 1 (0,1),(1,0),(9/16,9/16) 1, 0.5625, 0.5625 0.5625, 1, 0.5625
ε1 = 0.5, ε2 = 1 (0,1),(1,0),(9/16,9/16) 1, 0.5625, 0.5625 0.5625, 1, 0.5625
ε1 = 0.25, ε2 = 1 (0,1),(1,0),(9/16,9/16) 1, 0.5625, 0.5625 0.5625, 1, 0.5625
ε1 = 0.01, ε2 = 1 (0,1),(1,0),(9/16,9/16) 1, 0.5625, 0.5625 0.5625, 1, 0.5625
ε1 = 0.05, ε2 = 0.05 (0,1),(1,0),(9/16,9/16) 1, 0.5625, 0.5625 0.5625, 1, 0.5625
ε1 = 0.01, ε2 = 0.01 (0,1),(1,0),(9/16,9/16) 1, 0.5625, 0.5625 0.5625, 1, 0.5625
Figure 5.4: Distributionally robust Free Rider Game: Graph representation of players’ payoffs at
equilibria for any combination of risk attitudes.
Discussion of the Results:
We notice that when the ambiguity set of the distributionally robust free rider game is like the one
of equation (5.5) the risk levels of the two players do not influence the results of the game. For all
possible combinations of the risk attitudes the equilibria of the game are always the same as well
as the payoffs of the two players.
This results confirm our previous discussion, that in game theory situation is very difficult to
develop a rule about the players’ payoffs when their risk attitudes change.
Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Direction of
Research
6.1 Conclusions
In this thesis we managed to combine the areas of Game Theory and Distributionally Robust
Optimization and proposed a novel model of incomplete information games without private infor-
mation in which the players use a distributionally robust optimization approach to cope with payoff
uncertainty.
Part of this thesis was devoted in presenting three famous models of finite games. These are
the Complete Information Games (Nash Games), the Bayesian Games and the Robust Games
without private information. The basic theory of robust games was analysed in detail since our
distributionally robust approach presents many similarities with robust games’ framework. We
proposed a small extension of the special class of such games and we presented three methods
which can used for approximately computing sample robust optimization equilibria.
Following that, we introduced and analysed the new model of Distributionally Robust Games. In
this model players have only partial information about the probability distribution of the uncertain
payoff matrix. This information is expressed through a commonly known ambiguity set of all
distributions that are consistent with the known distributional properties. Similar to the robust
games framework, players in distributionally robust games adopt a worst case approach. Only
now the worst case is computed over all probability distributions within the ambiguity set. More
specifically, players use a worst case CVaR (Conditional Value at Risk) approach. This allows
players to have several risk attitudes which make our model even more coveted since in real life
applications players rarely are risk neutral.
We then showed that under specific assumptions about the ambiguity set and the values of risk
levels, distributionally robust game constitutes a true generalization of the three aforementioned
finite games (Nash games, Bayesian Games and Robust Games). This means that any finite game of
these three categories can be expressed as a distributionally robust game. Subsequently, we proved
that the set of equilibria of an arbitrary distributionally robust game with specified ambiguity set
and without private information can be computed as the component-wise projection of the solution
set of a multi-linear system of equations and inequalities. For special cases of such games we also
showed equivalence to complete information finite games (Nash Games) with the same number of
players and same action spaces.
Finally to concretize the idea of a distributionallly robust game we presented Distributionally
Robust Free Rider Game and Distributionally Robust Inspection Game. Through these two con-
crete examples we experimentally evaluated the new model of games and we studied how the number
of equilibria and the players’ payments change with small changes of the unknown parameters.
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6.2 Future Direction of Research
In this section we present some possible extensions of this work.
• Existence of equilibria in Distributionally Robust Games
For any class of finite games that we presented in this thesis (Nash Games, Bayesian Games,
Robust Games) a theorem that show the existence of equilibria has already proved. Due to
limited period of time we did not have the chance to prove the corresponding theorem for
our model. Hence, a theorem that show the existence of equilibria in Distributionally Robust
Finite Games seems a great extension of this work.
• Distributionally Robust Games with private information
In this thesis we focus only on the developing of Distributionally Robust Games without pri-
vate information. However, our work can be generalized to the case of distributionally robust
games involving potentially private information. This will require an extension of our com-
putation method for sampling equilibria to such situations that involve private information.
A potential proof of the existence of equilibria will also need extension to this context.
• More general classes of ambiguity sets
Interesting results might arise if we try to make the same work for more general classes of
ambiguity sets. Possible sets can be the ambiguity sets that Wiesemann, Kuhn and Sim
have considered in their pioneer paper “Distributionally Robust Convex Optimization” [44]
where they proposed a unifying framework for modelling and solving distributionally robust
optimization problems.
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Appendix
Transformation of the ambiguity sets
Before running our YALMIP code to obtain the desired results the ambiguity set of a Distribution-
ally Robust Game must be in specific form. In this part of the thesis we present the work that we
must do in order to create this form for the Distributionally Robust Free Rider Game and for the
Distributionally Robust Inspection Game of the experiments of Chapter 5.
In section (4.4) we presented the two concrete example of distributionally robust games that
we use during this thesis. The ambiguity sets for these games are:
For the distributionally robust free rider game:
F1 = {Q : Q[c˜ ∈ [cˇ−∆, cˇ+ ∆]] = 1, EQ[vec(P˜(c))] = m, EQ[
∥∥∥vec(P˜(c))−m∥∥∥
1
] ≤ s}
and for the distributionally robust indpection game:
F2 = {Q : Q[(g˜, v˜, h˜) ∈ [g, g]×[v, v]×[h, h]] = 1, EQ[vec(P˜(g,v,h))] = m, EQ[
∥∥∥vec(P˜(g,v,h))−m∥∥∥
1
] ≤ s}
In order to be able to solve this problems (using YALMIP) the ambiguity sets must be in the
following general form:
F = {Q : Q[P˜ ∈ U ] = 1, EQ[vecP˜ ] = m, EQ[
∥∥∥vec(P˜ )−m∥∥∥
1
] ≤ s}
where U = {P : W · vec(P ) ≤ h} is bounded and polyhedral set.
For this reason for each one of the distributionally robust games we must define:
• Matrix W ∈ R(m×N
∏N
i=1 ai) and vector h ∈ Rm which are the two parameters that represent
the uncertainty polyhedral set in which the uncertain values of the payoff matrix should
belong.
• The maximum distance of all possible vec(P˜ ) from the mean value m which is denoted by
scalar s. This could be any non-negative number.
• m ∈ RN
∏N
i=1 ai which is the vector that denotes the expected value of vec(P˜ ) for each distri-
bution that belongs in the ambiguity set. Vector m must belong to the bounded uncertainty
polyhedral set of the payoff matrix P˜ . Otherwise the ambiguity set F will be empty
In the experiments of Chapter 5 in the case of Distributionally Robust Free Rider Game
in order to create the ambiguity set of the general form we must use the following parameters:
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W =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0
−1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0
−1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0

, h =

6/8
−3/8
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
−1
1
−1
0
0
0
0

, m1 =

9/16
9/16
9/16
1
1
9/16
0
0

, m2 =

1/2
1/2
1/2
1
1
1/2
0
0

The values for matrix W and vector h are the values that correspond to c˜ ∈ [1/4, 5/8].
m1 and m2 are the two values of the average value m of the second constraint of the ambiguity
set that we used in our experiments. The value of m1 denote the nominal version of vec(P˜ ). That
is, it takes the value of vec(P˜ ) when the uncertain parameter c˜ is equal to the mid point of the
interval [1/4+5/8] (c˜ = cˇ =
1/4 + 5/8
2
= 7/16). m2 is the vector that is created if we assume that
the uncertain parameter c˜ is equal to 1/2. In order to avoid emptiness of the ambiguity set, both
m1 and m2 must belong in the uncertainty set that matrix W and vector h create.
The special case of support single point it is the only case for witch we can use different values
for W and h. This happens because now we must change the first constraint of the ambiguity set
in order to have only one possible payoff matrix P in the uncertainty set which it is also for certain
the matrix that corresponds to the average vector m of the second constraint.
In our experiment we assume that single support point is the matrix when c = 1/2. That is
Q[c˜ = 1/2] = 1 which in matrix form is equivalent with Q[P˜ = C] = 1 where C is the matrix with
parameter c=1/2. In order to run our YALMIP code the first constraint of the ambiguity set must
be expressed in terms of the uncertainty set U = {P : W ·vec(P ) ≤ h}. For this reason the matrix
W and vector h must take the following values:
W =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0
−1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0
−1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0

, h =

1/2
−1/2
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
−1
1
−1
0
0
0
0

Notice that matrix W remain the same but the vector h change.
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For the case of Distributionally Robust Inspection Game we must execute similar work.
More specifically in the experiments of Chapter 5 , the uncertain parameters of the payoff
matrix are: g˜ ∈ [8, 12], v˜ ∈ [16, 24], h˜ ∈ [4, 6] and w = 15.
Using same justification as in Distributionally Robust Free Rider Game the ambiguity set of
this game can be transformed to the general form ambiguity set only if matrix W and vectors h
and m of the general form take the following values:
W =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1

, h =

0
0
−4
6
15
−15
−15
15
7
−3
5
5
7
−3
9
−1

, m1 =

0
−5
15
−15
5
0
5
5

, m2 =

0
−5
15
−15
6
−3
6
2

The value of m1 denote the nominal version of the vec(P ). That is, it takes the value of
vec(P ) when the uncertain parameters g˜, v˜ and h˜ are equal to the mid points of their intervals
(g˜ = 10, v˜ = 20, h˜ = 5 and w = 15). Moreover, m2 is the vector that is created if we assume
that the parameters of the distributionally robust inspection game are equal to g = 9, v = 17h = 5
andw = 15. In order to avoid emptiness of the ambiguity set, both m1 and m2 must belong in the
uncertainty set that matrix W and vector h create.
Again for the special case of support single point (in our experiment when h=5,g=9,v=17 and
w=15), the uncertainty set must be singleton. Therefore, matrix W and vector h must change and
take the following values:
W =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1

, h =

0
0
−5
5
15
−15
−15
15
6
−6
−3
3
6
−6
2
−2

